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And to tell the truth, the quest for their ‘genuine’ legislative intent is
probably a wild-goose chase anyway.  In the vast majority of cases I
expect that Congress neither (1) intended a single result, nor
(2) meant to confer discretion upon the agency, but rather (3) didn’t
think about the matter at all.  If I am correct in that, then any rule
adopted in this field represents merely a fictional, presumed intent,
and operates principally as a background rule of law
against which Congress can legislate.1
The Kobold of the fiction often takes cruel vengeance upon
those who pursue it.2
I. INTRODUCTION
In King v. Burwell,3 the Supreme Court for the second time de-
cided a fundamental challenge to the Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Care Act (the ACA, also known as “Obamacare”).4 King v. Burwell
involved whether a few words of the ACA referring to tax subsidies for
those enrolled in an “Exchange established by the State” meant that a
major component necessary for the function of Obamacare was availa-
ble only in states that set up their own exchanges, exchanges being
governmental agencies or nonprofits designed to provide one-stop
shopping for health insurance.5  If so, arguably those tax subsidies
necessary for the functioning of Obamacare were unavailable in the
vast majority of states that instead relied on federal exchanges.
An important element of the Court’s decision was its determination
whether to defer, in the interpretation of those crucial words, to a reg-
ulation promulgated by the Treasury Department and the IRS that
stated that an exchange for the purposes of the ACA’s tax subsidies
included both those established and operated by the states as well as
those created and run by the federal Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS).  The Court was forced to address whether it
should defer to the agencies’ interpretation of the provision of ACA in
question pursuant to Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
1. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 516.
2. Rudof von Jhering, quoted in 13 PIERRE DE TOURTOULON, MODERN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY SERIES 383 (Martha McC. Read trans., 1922).
3. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
4. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
5. Amy E. Sanders, Note, A Gap in the Affordable Care Act: Will Tax Credits Be
Available for Insurance Purchased Through Federal Exchanges?, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 1259, 1262 (2013) (noting that the exchanges “facilitate the purchase of
qualified health plans, acting as a central portal for consumers to find and com-
pare health insurance options”).
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Council, Inc.6  The Court found that the key passage of the ACA was
ambiguous, which normally, under Chevron, would trigger deference
to the interpretation proffered by Treasury and the IRS.  Instead,
however, the Court held that, pursuant to what is known as Chevron
Step Zero,7 the deference normally mandated by Chevron was not ap-
propriate, and the Court determined for itself the meaning of the dis-
puted language of the ACA.8
This Article uses King v. Burwell as a lens to analyze the Chevron
doctrine and the Step Zero exceptions to it, as well as the extensive
legal fictions that form the basis for Chevron and Chevron Step Zero.
This Article argues that even though the Court reached the same re-
sult in King v. Burwell that it would have employing deference to
Treasury and the IRS’s determination, the stare decisis and, hence,
binding effect of the Court’s decision was much greater without such
deference. King v. Burwell displays the muddle and disarray exhib-
ited by the Chevron and Step Zero fictions and the challenges courts
have in applying them.  Worse yet, King v. Burwell adds further con-
fusion to the Step Zero exceptions to Chevron deference and makes
them more readily available without clear rules for the application of
Step Zero, rendering the Chevron doctrine an even more erratic, un-
predictable, inchoate, and dubious system of determining court defer-
ence to agency interpretation.
Much of this confusion stems from the misuse in the Chevron doc-
trine of its multiple legal fictions, a misuse that stems in part from the
modern lack of understanding of the purpose and utility of legal fic-
tions, their dangers and how they should be used properly to avoid
those hazards.  While legal fictions were, through the 1930s, the topic
of much scholarly interest and debate, study of them dropped dramati-
cally following the 1930s.  Only recently has scholarly interest in the
use and misuse of legal fictions resurfaced.  This Article revisits the
scholarship from the past, as updated and renewed by modern study
of legal fictions, to determine the lessons such scholarship teaches
about how legal fictions should be used.  Applying those lessons to the
Chevron doctrine indicates where the Chevron fictions have gone awry
and how they can be fixed and reformulated to achieve a more func-
tional, effective, and understandable deference doctrine.
Part II of this Article describes the chaotic passage of the ACA and
how that chaos contributed to legislation that melded together dispa-
rate versions that left conflicting language and unanswered questions.
It describes how the ACA was built on interlocking provisions, includ-
ing the granting of tax subsidies to those who would have substantial
6. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
7. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833
(2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).
8. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89 (2015).
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difficulty otherwise affording health insurance, which is the subject of
King v. Burwell.  Even though the model for the ACA had originally
been proposed by a conservative think tank, the ACA was largely re-
jected by Republicans during and after its passage, and many states
with Republican-controlled governorships, legislatures, or both re-
fused to set up the state exchanges envisioned by the drafters of the
ACA.  Instead, their states used the exchanges created by HHS, fed-
eral exchanges that were envisioned as a back-ups should states not
set up their own exchanges.
Part III of this Article discusses King v. Burwell and the challenge
to the ACA.  The plaintiffs were Virginia residents who did not want
to purchase health insurance but argued that they were being forced
to do so in violation of the express terms of the ACA because of the
IRS’s misinterpretation of the provision that tax subsidies would be
available in exchanges “established by the State.”  Because Virginia
used a federal exchange, plaintiffs argued, tax subsidies should not
have been made available to them, and because the cost of their health
insurance would exceed 8% of their income, they should have been ex-
empted by the ACA from the individual mandate that they buy
insurance.
In Part IV, this Article discusses Chevron’s delegation fiction and
the exceptions to that delegation fiction collectively known as Chevron
Step Zero.9  The Chevron delegation fiction asserts in essence that
where Congress leaves a gap or ambiguity in a statute that is adminis-
tered by a federal agency, that gap or ambiguity constitutes an im-
plicit delegation to that agency to use its interpretative powers to fill
the gap or resolve the ambiguity. Chevron has two steps, with Step
One being whether the statue in question resolves clearly or is ambig-
uous regarding the exact question that the agency interpretation
seeks to resolve.  Only upon a finding of ambiguity does a court reach
Step Two, determining whether the agency’s interpretation is a per-
missible one and hence should be followed by the court. Chevron Step
Zero is a collection of exceptions to the Chevron delegation doctrine,
based on the idea that in some cases courts should determine even
before Step One that the Chevron delegation fiction should not be ap-
plied in those cases.  Some aspects of Chevron Step Zero are also built
on fictional determinations about whether Congress would have
wanted the Chevron delegation doctrine to apply.
Part V discusses the application of Chevron in King v. Burwell,
first in the lower courts and then by the Supreme Court.  Although the
Chevron doctrine seemed to loom large in the determination of plain-
tiffs’ challenge to the ACA, the Supreme Court made quick and terse
work of the Chevron issue, holding with little discussion or explana-
9. Id.
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tion that, because Congress would not have wanted the IRS to make
this kind of decision, this case was not one for the IRS.10  The Court
based that conclusion on the importance of the question, in terms of
how central it was to the functioning of the ACA, the billions of dollars
involved, and the millions of people that could be affected.11
The Court based its analysis on two cases that do not seem to sup-
port its argument.  The Court’s argument seems contradicted by the
express delegation language contained in the ACA and by other court
decisions interpreting similar delegation language.  Perhaps more
surprisingly, the Court did not discuss whether, in absence of Chevron
deference, the interpretation by Treasury and the IRS deserve Skid-
more deference, a lesser form of deference that instructs courts to ex-
amine the value of the agency’s determination without being bound to
defer to it.
Part VI of this Article discusses the fictional basis of Chevron and
Step Zero and how those doctrines fly in the face of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).  While some argue that Chevron acts as a back-
ground against which Congress can legislate, the available evidence
indicates that it acts only weakly as a feedback loop, and that the am-
biguity in legislation often is no actual indication of intent by Con-
gress that courts defer to federal agencies to resolve that ambiguity.
This section also discusses the challenges created by Chevron’s linking
stare decisis to ambiguity, such that courts cannot prevent future con-
tradictory reinterpretation of the statute at issue by the agency unless
courts find either that the statute is not ambiguous, locking in the
court’s determination of the statute’s meaning, or find that pursuant
to some form of Step Zero the agency’s interpretation does not merit
Chevron deference.  This dilemma prevents courts from both giving
Chevron deference to the reasonable interpretation of agencies and
also locking in that meaning where there is a need for a final decision
that outweighs the benefits of the agency reinterpreting the statute in
the future.  I propose what I call “sticky deference,” which would be
giving Chevron deference to agency interpretation of an ambiguous
statute, but at the same time determining that despite that deference,
the interpretation must be so fixed so that subsequent agency reinter-
pretation could not change it.  Courts should be allowed to determine
the stickiness of their decisions without having to alter their decisions
on ambiguity or Step Zero to support stare decisis.
Part VII examines the history, development and definitions of legal
fictions, how they were used in Roman law and survived and spread in
English common law.  It reviews the scholarly battles over the values
and dangers of legal fictions, and how they can be used beneficially in
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2489.
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the first stages of a legal system, but hold great dangers if their use
persists, especially by jurists who do not recognize the fictional nature
of the rules they apply or the underlying rationale for those fictions.
Legal fictions can create new law or amend existing law and thus are
useful tools where the creation or amendment of law is difficult.
Where challenging barriers prevent the creation or amendment of
statutory or common law, necessary legal developments must take
place almost surreptitiously through the work of legal fictions.  In
more sophisticated legal systems, however, the primary purpose of le-
gal fictions is dogmatic rather than creative, to sort, understand, and
apply legal rules rather than create them.  In legal regimes permitting
appropriate statutory change, legal fictions are most useful as intellec-
tual tools to help jurists, attorneys, and others to group similar legal
concepts together, and in doing so, better understand those related
concepts and develop tools to manipulate them, all the while cognizant
of the fictional nature of the grouping.
Part VIII discusses the lessons taught by legal scholars about legal
fictions and then applies those lessons to the fictions underlying the
Chevron doctrine.  It demonstrates how the Chevron fictions violate
many of the strictures and admonishments created by scholars of legal
fiction taught over the decades and centuries. Chevron fictions are not
transparent to judges, who from their decisions typically appear to use
them without displaying meaningful understanding of their fictional
nature.  There is almost no discussion by courts of the fictional nature
of the Chevron delegation or the fictional aspects of Step Zero.  Instead
of discussing the Chevron fiction clearly and in a straightforward
manner, the Supreme Court only hints at it, discussing implicit dele-
gation and discussing what Congress would want or not want.  This
lack of transparency in the Chevron fictions has lead the Court astray
from the underlying policies that Chevron itself indicated as its ratio-
nale.  Scholars of legal fictions have noted that they were useful as
scaffolding in the creation of the legal edifice but serve to obscure the
structure once the building is done.  The Court in its post-Chevron de-
cisions has allowed the scaffolding of the Chevron fiction not only to
obscure the building itself but even to overwhelm it.
Part VIII concludes by proposing how reforming Chevron’s legal
fictions could fix the mess and confusion of Chevron.  If those legal
fictions were used only sparingly for the creation of law, and more typ-
ically and rigorously for the grouping and classification of law, then
the form of Chevron doctrine would not only be more ordered, but also
the policy bases for that doctrine would regain their primacy in deter-
mining the rules and boundaries of Chevron doctrine.  Furthermore,
judges would be more aware that they are employing mere fiction and
so would seek to apply more directly those underlying policy ratio-
nales.  The fictions would be useful to aid in the understanding and
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use of deferral doctrine, but would no longer cause judges blindly to
follow the dictates of the fictions.  Furthermore, by allowing courts to
delink Chevron deference and the stare decisis effects of their deci-
sions, courts would be free to defer to agency interpretation while at
the same time preventing future contradictory agency reinterpreta-
tion when necessary.
II. THE TUMULTUOUS PASSAGE OF THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT
King v. Burwell promised to be one of the most important cases of
the Supreme Court’s 2015 term, with the ACA,12 President Obama’s
signature health care plan, at risk of being eviscerated.13  The plain-
tiffs, seeking to dismantle the ACA, asked the Supreme Court to focus
on a few words of the massive ACA, namely those specifying that fed-
eral tax credit subsidies for the low-income to purchase health insur-
ance coverage under the ACA were available for such coverage
purchased through an “Exchange established by the State under sec-
tion 1311” of the ACA.14  According to plaintiffs, these words meant
that tax credit subsidies were not available for anyone in the thirty-
four states that had declined to set up their own exchanges and where
instead the Department of Health and Human Services set up federal
exchanges for those states.15
The ACA was designed to reform the health insurance market in
the United States by employing three “fundamental and interlocking”
provisions.16  First of all, the ACA forbids insurers from considering
the health and preexisting conditions in the determination of whether
to cover,17 how much to charge the potential insured,18 or both.  Man-
dated coverage, the cost of which is not dependent on the health of the
insured, is crucial to achieve the ACA’s goal of near universal health
insurance coverage.  Otherwise, insurance companies could merely re-
fuse to cover or substantially increase premiums for those more likely
12. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
13. Eric J. Segall & Jonathan H. Adler, King v. Burwell and the Validity of Federal
Tax Subsidies Under the Affordable Care Act, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 215, 216
(2015) (“On March 4, 2015, in King v. Burwell, ideologically driven plaintiffs will
once more ask the Justices to dismember President Obama’s signature legislative
achievement.”).
14. Brief for Petitioners at 18, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114),
2014 WL 7386999, at *18.
15. Brief for Appellants at 7, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114), 2014 WL 882811, at
*7.
16. Segall & Adler, supra note 13, at 217 (“From the moment the ACA was first intro-
duced in Congress, the entire legislation relied on three fundamental and inter-
locking ideas.”).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2012).
18. Id. § 300gg.
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to need substantial care because they have unhealthy habits, preexist-
ing conditions, or a family history of certain illnesses.19  The second
key provision of the ACA is the requirement that every person either
purchase or obtain at least minimum essential health insurance or,
failing that, pay a penalty to the Internal Revenue Service.20  This
provision, the individual mandate, is made necessary by the first pro-
vision, as it prevents people from waiting to buy insurance until they
become ill and need care.21  Doing so would allow them to be free rid-
ers on the system, obtaining the greatest benefit of insurance, which is
the possibility of coverage for treatment of major illnesses, without
paying for insurance while healthy.22
The third key provision, which was the subject of King v. Burwell,
is granting tax subsidies to the substantial number of Americans who
would have significant financial difficulty purchasing health insur-
ance.23  These tax subsidies not only render insurance more univer-
sally available by making it affordable but are also necessary for the
mandate to be effective.  Without subsidies, the cost of health insur-
ance would be prohibitive for many.  Under the ACA, those whose in-
surance costs exceed 8% of their income are not subject to penalty for
failing to obtain health insurance.24  Also, drawing in healthy,
younger insured Americans contributes to the financial stability of the
health insurance market.  If health insurers were forced to ignore pre-
existing conditions while lower-income individuals were not given pre-
mium subsidies, the result could be a death spiral, a vicious circle of
rising premiums caused by too few healthy persons buying insurance
with the resulting increased premiums causing even fewer healthy
persons to buy insurance.25
19. Deborah R. Farringer, Keeping Our Eyes on the Prize: Examining Minnesota as a
Means for Assuring Achievement of the “Triple Aim” Under the ACA, 38 HAMLINE
L. REV. 177, 197 (2015).
20. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012).
21. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Fragility of the Affordable Care Act’s Universal
Coverage Strategy, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 559, 567 (2015) (“Those requirements [re-
quiring coverage for those with preexisting conditions without additional cost],
however, present a significant adverse selection problem because individuals
could wait until they become sick to purchase coverage, thereby reducing the
quantum of low-risk individuals paying premiums into the pool to balance out the
cost of providing care to high-risk individuals.”).
22. David S. Schwartz, Presidential Politics as a Safeguard of Federalism: The Case
of Marijuana Legalization, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 599, 608 (2014).
23. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 18081–18082 (2012).
24. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e) (2012).
25. An Analysis of Health Insurance Premiums Under the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE 19 (Nov. 30, 2009), http://
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/107xx/doc10781/11-30-Premiums.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/MUM8-X6RW] (arguing that subsidies and the individual man-
date would reduce the adverse selection that would occur with the bar on consid-
ering preexisting conditions when determining rates or coverage).
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Originally, the model for the ACA had been proposed by conserva-
tives as an alternative to more liberal models, such as a single-payer
plan or a public option.26  The individual mandate-based vision of
health care reform was also preferred by Republicans over the em-
ployer-mandate version of health care reform proposed in 1993 (also
known as “HillaryCare” for its chief proponent, then-First Lady Hil-
lary Clinton).27  A rough outline of the ACA with an individual man-
date was drafted in 1989 by some in the Heritage Foundation.28  A
similar version was implemented in Massachusetts, signed by then-
Governor Mitt Romney, who famously said, “we got the idea of an indi-
vidual mandate . . . from [Newt Gingrich], and [Newt] got it from the
Heritage Foundation.”29  The ACA was based in large part on the
Massachusetts model, and President Obama and senior White House
officials sought advice from health care advisors who had taken a sig-
nificant role in shaping the Massachusetts plan.30  Even as late as
2009, Republican senator Charles Grassley stated, “there is a biparti-
san consensus to have an individual mandate.”31  However, in time for
26. Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into
Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Indepen-
dent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2013) (finding that a single-
payer plan would mandate that medical payments be made by a single govern-
mental entity, by and large removing private insurance companies from the
health insurance business). See generally Susan Adler Channick, Will Americans
Embrace Single-Payer Health Insurance: The Intractable Barriers of Inertia, Free
Market, and Culture, 28 LAW & INEQ. 1, 16 (Winter 2010) (arguing that a public-
option plan would allow a Medicare-like public plan to compete with private in-
surers in the health insurance market); Corrine Propas Parver, National Health
Care Reform: Has Its Time Finally Arrived?, 5 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 207,
215 (2009).
27. Michael Cooper, Conservatives Sowed Idea of Health Care Mandate, Only to
Spurn It Later, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/15/
health/policy/health-care-mandate-was-first-backed-by-conservatives.html.
28. Stuart M. Butler, Assuring Affordable Health Care for All Americans, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Oct. 1, 1989), http:// www.heritage.org/research/lecture/assuring-afford-
able-health-care-for-all-americans [https://perma.unl.edu/7736-H76Q].  The Heri-
tage report justifies the individual mandate by saying that it “is based on two
important principles.  First, that health care protection is a responsibility of indi-
viduals, not businesses. . . .  Second, it assumes that there is an implicit contract
between households and society, based on the notion that health insurance is not
like other forms of insurance protection.” Id.
29. Avik Roy, The Tortuous History of Conservatives and the Individual Mandate,
FORBES (Feb. 7, 2012, 3:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/02/07/the-
tortuous-conservative-history-of-the-individual-mandate/.
30. Michael Isikoff, White House Used Mitt Romney Health-Care Law as Blueprint
for Federal Law, MSNBC (Oct. 11, 2011, 6:05 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/44854320/ns/politics-decision_2012/t/ [https://perma.unl.edu/K5BT-TGC8].
31. Ezra Klein, The Republican Turn Against Universal Health Insurance, WASH.
POST (June 30, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2012/
06/30/the-republican-turn-against-universal-health-insurance/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/9SJJ-E782].
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the 2012 election, the Republican party changed its collective mind on
the wisdom of this form of universal coverage, and Republicans in
Congress opposed it both as a matter of public policy and party
doctrine.32
The passage of the ACA in 2010 was rushed and completed without
Republican support, as “not a single Republican in either the House or
the Senate voted for the most far reaching piece of domestic legislation
in forty-five years.”33  Five different congressional committees worked
on drafts of the legislation, and their multiple drafts were merged fit-
fully into one draft.34  The Senate passed what many considered a
rough draft of the bill that would be cleaned up, removing redundan-
cies and ambiguities, as the House passed its own version, the cham-
bers of Congress negotiated their differences, and the bill went
through the Conference Committee stage.35  After the August 25,
2009 death of Senator Edward Kennedy, however, Democrats in the
Senate had fewer than the 60 votes they needed to defeat a filibuster
and so could not easily negotiate changes to the Senate bill in order to
pass an amended bill.  Instead, the House passed the Senate bill, and
then Congress employed the budget reconciliation process, which re-
quired only a simple majority to pass the ACA.36  Using the reconcilia-
tion process meant that any changes to the Senate bill were strictly
limited and had to “meet the arcane and rigorous restrictions of recon-
ciliation.”37  As a result, many drafting errors remained in the bill,
including, for example, the provision of three separate and distinct
sections 1563.38
Congressional Republicans railed bitterly against the bill, claiming
it was unconstitutional and accusing Democrats of refusing to negoti-
ate for ideological reasons.39  After the ACA was passed, its opponents
32. Alberto R. Gonzales & Donald B. Stuart, Two Years Later and Counting: The
Implications of the Supreme Court’s Taxing Power Decision on the Goals of the
Affordable Care Act, 17 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 219, 247 (2014) (“The issue of
universal healthcare itself became particularly relevant and controversial in the
2012 election cycle, and in spite of the President’s re-election many Republicans
continue to oppose the Act as a matter of policy and political doctrine.”).
33. Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 276–81 (2011).
34. Abbe R. Gluck, Why Health Lawyers Must Be Public-Law Lawyers: Health Law in
the Age of the Modern Regulatory State, 18 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 323, 326
(2015).
35. Id. at 327.
36. Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, The Supreme Court 2011
Term, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 45 (2012).
37. David A. Super, The Modernization of American Public Law: Health Care Reform
and Popular Constitutionalism, 66 STAN. L. REV. 873, 877 (2014).
38. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2492 (noting tartly, “The Affordable Care Act con-
tains more than a few examples of inartful drafting.”).
39. Huma Khan, Obama Signs Health Care Bill Today as GOP Challenges Constitu-
tionality, ABC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/HealthCare/
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sought to defeat it both politically and in the courts.  Republicans ran
successfully against the ACA in the 2010 midterm elections and, ac-
cording to one poll, more than 70% of voters said that their midterm
vote that year was a message about the ACA with a majority opposing
it.40  Republicans not only retook the House of Representatives, but
also took over a majority of state legislatures, making the biggest gain
in both areas that any party has made since 1938.41  By gaining con-
trol of the House, Republicans also gained the power to block legisla-
tive fixes to the ACA and so, in any court challenge, Obamacare had to
stand or fall on its original, rushed legislation.  To express Republican
antipathy for Obamacare, the House has held over sixty votes to re-
peal it.42
III. KING V. BURWELL AND THE CHALLENGE TO THE ACA
While many opponents of the ACA objected to it on the grounds
that it constituted excessive limitation of economic liberty and individ-
ual freedom in health care decision making, the litigation against the
ACA has proceeded primarily on other grounds.43  In the first ACA
case to reach the Supreme Court, National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius (NFIB),44 plaintiffs argued that the ACA was in-
valid not because of its infringement of individual liberties, but rather
because it violated the structure of the Constitution by exceeding the
powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause of Article I.45  In
NFIB, the Supreme Court held that while the individual mandate
could not be enforced pursuant to Congress’s power under the Com-




40. David Lauter, Obamacare Was a Secondary Issue in Election, Republican Poll
Finds, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/polit-
ics/politicsnow/la-pn-obamacare-election-20141107-story.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/S9MD-892N].
41. Dan Balz, The GOP Takeover in the States, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2010), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/13/
AR2010111302389.html [https://perma.unl.edu/M6LS-H926].
42. S.M., How Obamacare Has Been Attacked in Court, ECONOMIST: ECONOMIST EX-
PLAINS (Mar. 23, 2016, 4:08 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-ex-
plains/2016/03/economist-explains-19 [https://perma.unl.edu/TD8M-CAWV].
43. Abigail R. Moncrieff, Safeguarding the Safeguards: The ACA Litigation and the
Extension of Indirect Protection to Nonfundamental Liberties, 64 FLA. L. REV.
639, 642 (2012).
44. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
45. Moncrieff, supra note 43, at 642.
46. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (“The individual mandate cannot be upheld as an exer-
cise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.”).
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Unlike the constitutional argument in NFIB, King v. Burwell fo-
cuses on a strictly statutory issue, namely whether the ACA’s tax sub-
sidies for lower income health insurance purchasers are available in
states that did not set up their own exchanges but instead rely on fed-
eral exchanges.47  The ACA, in section 1401, added § 36B to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, authorizing federal tax credit subsidies to make
health insurance more affordable.  Section 36B(b)(2)(A) provides that
tax subsidies are available to insured taxpayers covered by qualified
health plans “which were enrolled in through an Exchange estab-
lished by the State . . . .”48  Section 36B seems expressly to address tax
subsidies for state exchanges, not federal exchanges.  Although King
v. Burwell appears to focus on a strictly statutory issue, some have
noted the constitutional implications of the plaintiffs’ challenges, in-
cluding how far the Obama administration can “interpret” the under-
lying statute without violating the Constitution’s separation of powers
and staying within the boundaries of the President’s constitutional
authority.49
This disputed language in § 36B seems to be the result of the merg-
ing of versions of ACA bills from two separate Senate committees, one
requiring states to set up state exchanges, and another that “explicitly
envisioned state and federal exchanges, and clearly made subsidies
available in both cases.”50  In other words, it appears that both ver-
sions of the bill provided for tax subsidies in all fifty states, but did so
in different ways, one solely through state exchanges and the other
through a potential mix of federal and state exchanges.51  An analysis
of the ACA based on documents from the respective committees and
interviews of “staffers directly involved in the drafting of the statutes”
concluded that the language regarding state exchanges arose from the
less than perfect meshing of two versions of the bill rather than from
any intent that tax subsidies be denied to those in states with a fed-
47. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015).
48. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012).
49. Ronald D. Rotunda, King v. Burwell and the Rise of the Administrative State, 23
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 267, 280 (2015) (“The assertion of a Presidential power or
an agency power to amend, unilaterally, or to suspend statute raises significant
questions.  If the President has absolute discretion to ignore laws that he prefers
not to exist, the Constitutional limits of Presidential authority have the re-
straining power of air.”).
50. Greg Sargent, Senate Documents and Interviews Undercut ‘Bombshell’ Lawsuit




51. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, Tax Credits on Federally Created Exchanges: Les-
sons from a Legislative Process Failure Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 99
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 101, 111–17 (2015) (providing a detailed analysis of
the legislative history of the ACA).
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eral exchange. 52  At the time, most involved in the process seem to
have considered state exchanges to be the prime conduit for health
insurance, with federal exchanges a perhaps not-too-important
fallback.53
Republicans’ vehement opposition to the ACA made the federally
operated exchanges much more important, however, as the majority of
states declined to set up state exchanges.  Only thirteen states, along
with the District of Columbia, initially set up their own exchanges.54
Another three states set up a “federally-supported exchange,” relying
on the technical infrastructure of the federal exchanges, which may
receive the same treatment as a state-based exchange.55  Among the
Republicans who campaigned against Obamacare and in the states
that are politically hostile to the ACA, there has been little inclination
to set up state exchanges.56  Governors can block the implementation
of a state exchange all by themselves, as HHS has required that state
declarations setting up state exchanges be signed by the governors
themselves.57  As of January 13, 2017, twenty-eight states still relied
on federally facilitated marketplaces.58
The claim that the disputed language might bar tax subsidies in
states with federal exchanges was first noted by employment benefits
attorney Tom Christina, who told a December 2010 gathering of “con-
servative lawyers and activists” that he had “noticed something pecu-
liar in the tax-credit section” of the already-passed law, namely,
according to him, that “there will be no tax credits for taxpayers who
52. Sargent, supra note 50; see Jonathan Cohn, One More Clue that the Obamacare
Lawsuits Are Wrong, NEW REPUBLIC (July 28, 2014), http://
www.newrepublic.com/article/118867/email-house-aide-undermines-halbig-law-
suit-obamacare-subsidies [https://perma.unl.edu/Y4LQ-DDBS].
53. Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation Without Representation: The
Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the PPACA, 23 HEALTH MATRIX: J.
L.-MED. 119, 148-149 (2013) (“The congressional debate over the PPACA and its
antecedents correspondingly emphasized state-run Exchanges over federal
Exchanges.”).
54. Dan Mangan, States Shuttering Obamacare Exchanges, but Should They? CNBC
(July 22, 2015, 3:11 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/22/states-shuttering-
obamacare-exchanges-but-should-they.html [https://perma.unl.edu/2ADP-
WPWG].
55. Josh Blackman, The Legality of Executive Action After King v. Burwell, 16 EN-
GAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 8, 8 (2015).
56. Nicholas Bagley, David K. Jones & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Predicting the Fallout
from King v. Burwell—Exchanges and the ACA, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101 (Jan.
8, 2015), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1414191 [https://
perma.unl.edu/D3LC-UGYY].
57. Bridget A. Fahey, Health Care Exchanges and the Disaggregation of States in the
Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 56, 60 (2015).
58. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, State Health Insurance Marketplace
Types, 2017 (Jan. 2017), http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-
insurance-marketplace-types/ [https://perma.unl.edu/52EB-MFAH].
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live in non-capitulating states.”59  Even with the concerted opposition
to Obamacare, it appears that it took months after its passage for any-
one to conceive of the argument that because of the “four previously
unnoticed words” (“established by the state”) tax subsidies were not
available in states with federal exchanges.60
The Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service
attempted to head off any successful litigation based on the disputed
language, using the authority and mandate granted to the Secretary
of the Treasury in § 36B(g) of the Internal Revenue Code.  That sec-
tion provides that the Secretary “shall prescribe such regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.”61  Trea-
sury therefore was not only allowed to prescribe those regulations—it
was mandated to do so by statute where necessary.
On August 17, 2011, Treasury and the IRS published a notice of
proposed rulemaking, with the proposed rules stating that “an ex-
change” under the tax credit provisions of the ACA would have the
same meaning as in 45 C.F.R. § 155.20, which states, “Exchange
means a governmental agency or non-profit entity . . . regardless of
whether the Exchange is established and operated by a State (includ-
ing a regional Exchange or subsidiary Exchange) or by HHS.” 62  The
IRS held a public hearing and received comments.  An analysis of
those comments found that only two comments referred to this issue,
both arguing that tax subsidies should not be available except in ex-
changes established by the states.63  The IRS determined that, be-
cause “provisions of the Affordable Care Act support the
interpretation that credits are available to taxpayers who obtain cov-
erage through a State Exchange, regional Exchange, subsidiary Ex-
change, and the Federally-facilitated Exchange” and because “the
relevant legislative history does not demonstrate that Congress in-
tended to limit the premium tax credit to State Exchanges,” the final
IRS regulations should retain the definition of “exchange” that al-
lowed taxpayers in federal exchanges to qualify for tax subsidies.64
59. David G. Savage, Obamacare Case Began when Conservative Lawyer Saw Possi-
ble Flaw in Law, L.A. TIMES (March 3, 2015, 5:12 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
business/la-fi-court-case-origins-20150304-story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
LXM2-JNUP].
60. Adam Liptak, Lawyer Put Health Act in Peril by Pointing Out 4 Little Words,
N.Y. TIMES (March 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/us/politics/in-
four-word-phrase-challenger-spied-health-care-laws-vulnerability.html.
61. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(g) (2012).
62. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 76 Fed. Reg. 50,931-01, 50,940 (Aug. 17,
2011) (noting that in § 1.36B-1(k), “Exchange has the same meaning as in 45 CFR
155.20.”).
63. Sanders, supra note 5, at 1277.
64. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377-01, 30,378 (May 23,
2012).
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The petitioners in King v. Burwell were four Virginia residents
who did not want to buy health insurance and who argued that, be-
cause Virginia has a federally-operated exchange, they were not eligi-
ble for tax subsidies as, according to their lawsuit, Virginia did not
have an exchange established by the state.65  Because they claimed
they were not eligible for tax subsidies, the plaintiffs argued that the
cost of health insurance would exceed 8% of their income and so, pur-
suant to the ACA, exempt them from the requirement of purchasing
health insurance.66  However, they asserted, the IRS’s interpretation
of the tax credit language would make them eligible for tax subsidies,
as the exchange in Virginia would then constitute a “an Exchange es-
tablished by the State” and so the IRS’s interpretation would force
them to purchase health insurance that they do not want.67  The trial
court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss,68 and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed.69  In a similar case decided two hours earlier, Halbig v.
Burwell, a three-judge panel of the District of Columbia Circuit found
that such tax subsidies were available only in state-run exchanges,
and not those federally operated.70
If the Supreme Court had found that tax subsidies were not availa-
ble in states that had not set up their own exchanges, the effect would
have been immediate and likely disastrous.  Millions were predicted to
lose their health insurance.71  If healthy families left the marketplace
because they could not afford insurance without subsidies and were
not required to purchase it because their incomes were too low, the
pool of those in non-group insurance would be older and less healthy,
and insurance companies would have to raise their premiums in rec-
ognition of the higher costs associated with this more expensive pool.
One study estimated that 8.2 million would lose their health insur-
ance coverage and that premiums would go up by 35%, and other esti-
65. Complaint at ¶ 6, King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415 (E.D. Va., Sept. 16, 2014)
(No. 3:13-cv630), 2013 WL 11104282.
66. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015).
67. Id. at 2488.
68. King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415 (E.D. Va. 2014).
69. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 2014).
70. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt
v. Burwell, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1080 (E.D. Okla. 2014) (No. 6:11-CV-00030), 2014 WL
4854543 (agreeing with Halbig that tax subsidies should not be provided for
those in federal exchanges).
71. BORDELON ET AL., LEAVITT PARTNERS, THE STAGE IS SET: PREDICTING STATE AND
FEDERAL REACTIONS TO King v. Burwell 1 (2015), http://leavittpartners.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/2015-01-The-Stage-is-Set-Predicting-State-and-Federal-
Reactions-to-King-v-Burwell.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/WT9Z-MGXC] (“A cor-
nerstone of the law is in question and there is a very real possibility that nearly
five million citizens enrolled through the federal marketplace may lose access to
subsidized coverage.”).
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mates of premium increases were even higher. 72  Some predicted that
states with federal exchanges could go into a partial or full “death spi-
ral,” where insurance premiums go up because fewer healthy and
more sick purchase insurance, and then the increased premium cost
itself drives more healthy insured to drop their coverage, which would
raise rates even more.73  Rates could have gone up so much as to effec-
tively shut down the market.74
There would have been few good options to fix such a result.  States
could conceivably have scrambled to set up state exchanges to replace
the federal exchange, though the transition could have been costly and
messy and could have taken more time than the Supreme Court ruling
might have provided to states.  States that had refused to set up ex-
changes could have legislatures or governors still unwilling to set up
such exchanges, even when failing to do so could threaten their health
insurance availability statewide.75  Furthermore, there is some ques-
tion whether state exchanges set up after a 2014 deadline in the ACA
would count as state exchanges for all purposes under the Act.76  The
Obama administration could have attempted to deem that some fed-
eral exchanges constitute state exchanges where the state cooperates
in aspects of the exchange, though this “deeming” would likely have
run into its own legal challenge.77
Of course, in theory Congress could revise Obamacare in response
to any Supreme Court decision, though with a Republican Congress
intent on dismantling the ACA and a Democratic president deter-
mined to preserve it, it is difficult to imagine a successful negotiation
of an alternative version, especially before the 2016 presidential elec-
tion.  The election of Donald Trump has made the future of Obama-
72. Compare Linda J. Blumberg et al., The Implications of a Supreme Court Finding
for the Plaintiff in King vs. Burwell: 8.2 Million More Uninsured and 35% Higher
Premiums, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. & URBAN INST. (Jan. 2015), http://
www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2015/01/the-implications-of-a-supreme-court-
finding-for-the-plaintiff-in.html [https://perma.unl.edu/83QM-UQFM], with EVAN
SALTZMAN & CHRISTINE EIBNER, RAND CORP., THE EFFECT OF ELIMINATING THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S TAX CREDITS IN FEDERALLY FACILITATED MARKETPLACES
(2015), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/
RR980/RAND_RR980.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/4BFX-JVME] (estimating that 6
million would lose insurance and unsubsidized individual premiums would in-
crease by 47%).
73. Robert F. Graboyes, What If Obamacare Loses?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (March




75. Nicholas Bagley & David K. Jones, No Good Options: Picking up the Pieces After
King v. Burwell, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 13, 22 (2015).
76. Id. at 16–18.
77. Id. at 20–21.
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care uncertain, as many Republicans vow to repeal as much of it as
they can, though parts may survive such appeal.78
IV. CHEVRON AND “STEP ZERO”
A. The Chevron Doctrine
Because the IRS and Treasury had already issued regulations that
interpreted the provisions at issue in Burwell and purported to resolve
the question at issue, it was clear throughout the Burwell litigation
that a crucial issue would be whether and how to apply the doctrine of
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.79
Chevron is perhaps the most important case in American administra-
tive law and essentially sets out a roadmap, albeit a confusing one, of
whether and when courts should defer to a federal agency’s interpre-
tation of a statute.  Before Chevron, courts would defer to agency in-
terpretation of a statute when Congress expressly delegated the
authority to an agency’s power to fill a gap in a statute.80  Otherwise,
agency interpretation, “while not controlling,” could, under the stan-
dard set forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., guide a court based on the
agency’s “body of experience and informed judgment,” but this is a
mere power to persuade, and the persuasiveness “will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronounce-
ments, and all those factors which give it power to persuade . . . .”81
Chevron’s great change was to declare that congressional delega-
tion of interpretative authority to agencies could be implicit and de-
rived from mere ambiguity in the statute, a fictional delegation
granting agencies the power to interpret statutes they oversee where
there are gaps in those statues.82  As the Court later explained in Na-
tional Cable & Telecommunication Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,
“ ‘[T]he whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by
the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.’ . . . Chev-
78. Kelsey Snell & Mike DeBonis, Why Obamacare is Unlikely to Die a Swift Death,




79. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
80. The Court in Chevron noted:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific pro-
vision of the statute by regulation.  Such legislative regulations are
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or mani-
festly contrary to the statute.
Id. at 843–44.
81. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
82. Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2015).
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ron’s premise is that it is for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory
gaps.”83
The Court in Chevron noted specific policy reasons for courts to
defer to agencies, such as the greater political accountability of agen-
cies and the Executive Branch,84 as well as the expertise and experi-
ence of agencies charged with administering the statute at issue.85
Legal scholars have proposed other rationales for such deference, in-
cluding political responsiveness, deliberative rationality, and national
uniformity.86
The Chevron opinion, however, rests on the legal fiction that Con-
gress, by leaving a gap or ambiguity in a statute, evinces an intent to
delegate to the administering agency the power to fill in that gap.87
The Court in Chevron did not find any evidence of this implied delega-
tion either in that case or generally, but merely created it out of whole
cloth, even though Justice Stevens, the author of the opinion, seem-
ingly did not intend to create a novel legal fiction but rather to “merely
[confirm] existing law.”88  As both Justices Breyer and Scalia have dis-
cussed in separate law review articles, this implication of delegation is
an important legal fiction newly created by the Supreme Court in
Chevron.89
Chevron requires a two-step process to determine whether courts
should defer to agency interpretation of law.  In Step One, the court
first must ask whether the law itself is ambiguous, or in the words of
83. 545 U.S. 967, 981–82 (2005) (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.,
517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)).
84. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political
branch of the Government to make such policy choices. . . .”).
85. Id. (“Perhaps [Congress] consciously desired the Administrator to strike the bal-
ance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with re-
sponsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do
so.”).
86. See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1275
(2008) (arguing that the delegation fiction should be “pierced” and that deference
should be based on “five core factors: (1) congressionally delegated authority, (2)
agency expertise, (3) political responsiveness and accountability, (4) deliberative
rationality, and (5) national uniformity”).
87. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a
particular question is implicit rather than explicit.  In such a case, a court may
not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable inter-
pretation made by the administrator of an agency.”); Scott H. Angstreich, Shor-
ing Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory
Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 91 (2000) (“Insofar as Chevron in-
structs lower courts to treat a statutory ambiguity as an implicit delegation of
interpretive authority, it is widely understood to rest on a fiction.”).
88. Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senes-
cence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 743 (2007).
89. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 370 (1986); Scalia, supra note 1, at 516.
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the case, “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise ques-
tion at issue.”90  If the statue is unambiguous, then no deference by
the court to an agency interpretation is necessary, since “[i]f the intent
of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress.”91  Courts must reject agency interpretations “which are
contrary to clear congressional intent.”92  During their Step One anal-
yses, courts should employ “traditional tools of statutory construction”
to determine whether the statute is ambiguous.93  If a court finds that
the statute is ambiguous in Chevron Step One, then the court should
proceeds to Step Two of Chevron, where “if the statute is silent or am-
biguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.”94
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of Chevron, as it
dramatically realigned the respective powers of the courts and federal
agencies.  While traditionally judges had understood, pursuant to
Marbury v. Madison,95 that the job of the judiciary was to state what
the law was, Chevron asserted that, where the law is embodied in a
statute supervised by a federal agency, often instead it is the agency’s
job to state what the law means, and the courts should merely defer to
the agency’s interpretation of the law. Marbury had asserted the right
of the courts not only to invalidate acts of Congress as unconstitu-
tional, but also to assert some judicial control over the Executive
Branch by enforcing certain statutory obligations of administrative of-
ficials.96  The Marbury vision of courts stating “what the law is” in the
face of contrary agency interpretation had already been significantly
diminished pre-Chevron by numerous court decisions granting agen-
cies lesser forms of deference.97  Still, as Cass Sunstein noted, Chev-
90. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
91. Id. at 842–43.
92. Id. at 843 n.9.
93. Id. (“If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains
that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is
the law and must be given effect.”).  There is significant debate about “which am-
biguities should signal a delegation of lawmaking authority.”  Christopher J.
Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1006
(2015).
94. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
95. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
96. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 3–4 (1983).
97. In his seminal article which suggested the contours of deference to agency inter-
pretation and which was written immediately before Chevron, Monaghan stated,
“Marshall’s grand conception of judicial autonomy in law declaration” in Marbury
“seemed to condemn the now entrenched practice of judicial deference to adminis-
trative construction of law.” Id. at 2.
2017] DEFERENCE AND FICTION 721
ron “has become a kind of Marbury, or counter-Marbury, for the
administrative state.”98
Chevron’s reach can be seen in the fact that it has been cited by
more than 15,000 other cases and by more than 11,000 law review and
journal articles since its 1984 publication.99 Chevron has been called
the “third most cited Supreme Court case in history,”100 “the most
cited (and perhaps debated) administrative law decision of all time,”
101 and “one of the most important constitutional law decisions in his-
tory.”102 Chevron is so often discussed in the legal academy that there
is even a small cottage industry of scholarship referring to Chevron
scholarship as a “cottage industry.”103
B. Chevron Step Zero
There are important limits to the Chevron doctrine, though those
limits are fuzzy and ill-defined.  The Supreme Court has lurched
about, trying to determine limitations of Chevron, where despite gaps
in legislation agencies sought to fill, courts should not defer to agency
interpretation and so should not apply the two steps of Chevron.  The
question of whether the Chevron framework should even apply comes
before the two steps of Chevron, and so the determination of this issue
is referred to as “Chevron Step Zero,” a term invented by Merrill
and Hickman,104 made popular by an influential law review
article by Sunstein,105 and even adopted informally by the Court it-
98. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071, 2075 (1990).
99. A WestlawNext search on April 28, 2017 indicated that Chevron has been cited by
15,072 cases and 11,003 law review and journal articles.  Naturally, more citing
cases and law review articles are added on a regular basis.
100. Gluck, supra note 34, at 341.
101.  WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW 275 (4th ed. 2012).
102. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225,
2227 (1997).
103. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Su-
preme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1123 (2008); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph
O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 924 (2008);
Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says It’s a Crime?: Chevron Deference to Agency In-
terpretations of Regulatory Statutes That Create Criminal Liability, 58 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1996); Michael A. Livermore, Reviving Environmental Protection: Pref-
erence-Directed Regulation and Regulatory Ossification, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 311,
340 (2007); Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword: Chevron at 30:
Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 495 (2014); David
A. Schlesinger, Comment, Chevron Unlatined: The Inapplicability of the Canon
Noscitur A Sociis Under Prong One of the Chevron Framework, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 638, 647 (1996).
104. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 7, at 836.
105. Sunstein, supra note 7.  Sunstein acknowledges that he got his “Step Zero” title
from Merrill and Hickman. Id. at 191, n.19.
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self.106  Merrill and Hickman define Step Zero as “the inquiry that
must be made in deciding whether courts should turn to the Chevron
framework at all, as opposed to the Skidmore framework or deciding
the interpretational issue de novo.”107  While many different issues
can come into play at Step Zero, “Step Zero analysis tends to focus on
two factors: ‘whether Congress delegated to the agency power to act
with the force of law;’ and whether the agency exercised ‘such author-
ity in adopting the interpretation at issue.’”108
These Step Zero limitations are important for several reasons.
Without them, the implicit delegation of gap-filling interpretive pow-
ers to administrative agencies would be too broad and would consti-
tute a massive (and unintentional) transfer of power by the courts to
those agencies.109  Also, the Court has concluded that there are cir-
cumstances where an administrative agency should not be accorded
Chevron deference but still some weight should be given to its inter-
pretation of a statute it administers, leading to the survival of the
lesser Skidmore deference.110  Given that there are multiple deference
possibilities, some test must determine which to accord an agency de-
termination, and that determination is another aspect of Step Zero.111
Some Step Zero tests seem firmly grounded in the Constitution or
congressional intent.  For example, one court noted as a Step Zero
test: “whether the agency is Chevron-qualified, meaning whether the
agency involved is the agency charged with administering the stat-
ute . . . .”112 Chevron applies only to statutes that the agency involved
administers.113  According to the Supreme Court, “A precondition to
deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administra-
tive authority.”114  Thus, agencies are not owed Chevron deference for
106. Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753,
761 (2014) (noting multiple uses of this term by various justices and citing Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 6, 8, 11, 26, and 28); City of Arlington, Tex. V. FCC,
133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
107. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 7, at 836.
108. Christine Kexel Chabot, Selling Chevron, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 481, 494 (2015)
(quoting Kristen E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
527, 537 (2014) (discussing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27
(2001))).
109. Merrill, supra note 106, at 759 (“Taken literally, the idea that any gap or ambigu-
ity is an implied delegation to an agency would represent a massive expansion of
administrative authority.”).
110. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.
111. Merrill, supra note 106, at 759.
112. Jarita Mesa Livestock Grazing Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Ser., 58 F. Supp. 3d 1191,
1228 & n.9 (D.N.M. 2014).
113. The court in Chevron began its analysis stating, “When a court reviews an
agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with
two questions.”  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842 (1984).
114. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990).
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statutes of general applicability that happen to affect them.  For ex-
ample, because the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is governed
by the APA, rather than administering it, courts should not defer to
the FDA’s interpretation of the APA.115  Other aspects of the Step
Zero test are based on a fictional exception to the Chevron fiction that,
in certain cases, the courts should assume, even without mention by
Congress, that Congress would not want courts to render Chevron def-
erence to agency interpretation even when faced with gaps or ambigu-
ities in the statute.116  Of course, creating fictional exceptions to the
Chevron fiction is a recipe for even more confusion and makes it
harder for courts to focus on the underlying policy considerations that
should guide their decisions rather than on the fictions themselves.
If, under Step Zero, agency determinations are not given Chevron
deference, then pursuant to Christensen v. Harris County117 and
United States v. Mead Corp.,118 they should still generally be eligible
for Skidmore deference, a much weaker form of deference.119  Under
Skidmore, the deference courts give an agency determination “will de-
pend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronounce-
ments, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.”120  In other words, under Chevron deference, agen-
cies are primary arbiters of the meaning of statutes they administer,
so long as their interpretations are reasonable.  Under Skidmore def-
erence, agencies may persuade courts with their reasoning, process,
and consistency, but courts retain the ability to overrule even reasona-
ble agency decisions where courts are not persuaded by the agencies.
Professor Strauss perhaps best explained the difference between
Skidmore and Chevron deference by explaining that Chevron defer-
ence provides agencies with a defined space in which they are free to
interpret and reinterpret statutes, as their policies change, and courts
should not interfere with those changing policy reinterpretations.121
Skidmore, on the other hand, merely adds weight to the agency’s in-
115. Sunstein, supra note 7, 208–09.
116. The fictional basis of the Step Zero exceptions to Chevron will be discussed in
section VIII.A.
117. Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 586 (2000).
118. United States v. Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
119. Id. at 234; Christensen, 529 U.S. at 1663. See also Michael P. Healy, Reconciling
Chevron, Mead, and the Review of Agency Discretion: Source of Law and the
Standards of Judicial Review, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing the
review standards used by courts for agency determinations).
120. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
121. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space”
and Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012) (“ ‘Chevron space’
denotes the area within which an administrative agency has been statutorily em-
powered to act in a manner that creates legal obligations or constraints—that is,
its delegated or allocated authority.”).
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terpretation, and the amount of weight to be added is dependent on
how well the agency conducts and justifies that interpretation.122
Step Zero analyses can be broken down to process concerns and
substance concerns.  Regarding process concerns, the court asks
whether Congress authorized and the agency employed sufficiently
formal process in reaching its interpretation of the statute to justify
Chevron deference.  Regarding substance concerns, the court queries
whether the substance of the agency’s interpretation determination
indicates that Congress would not have intended courts to defer to
that agency’s interpretation in this issue, regardless of the sufficiency
and formality of the agency’s process in finalizing that interpretation.
Justice Breyer’s decision for the Court in Barnhart v. Walton gave
some indication of the factors, some substantive, some procedural, to
be examined in a court’s Step Zero analysis.
In this case, the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise
of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute,
the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the
Agency has given the question over a long period of time all indicate that
Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through which to view the legality
of the Agency interpretation here at issue.123
In Breyer’s list, careful consideration by the agency is a process
concern, and one which the agency can deal with through its actions.
The “interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of
the Agency, the importance of the question, the complexity of that ad-
ministration”124 are all substance questions, such that agencies can-
not fix problems even through additional process.
First to Step Zero process questions.  One issue the court has wres-
tled with is how the formality of an agency’s decision making affects
the deference to be given to its statutory interpretation.  In Christen-
sen, the Court found that “an interpretation contained in an opinion
letter[,] . . . like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of
law—do[es] not warrant Chevron-style deference,” unlike “for exam-
ple, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking . . . .”125
Formal rulemaking and notice-and-comment rulemaking are, of
course, the two primary methods the APA mandates agencies employ
to issue regulations.126 Christensen seemed to indicate that informal
122. Id. (“ ‘Skidmore [sic] weight’ addresses the possibility that an agency’s view on a
given statutory question may in itself warrant respect by judges who themselves
have ultimate interpretive authority.”).
123. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
124. Id.
125. Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 586 (2000).
126. Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An
Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1424 & n. 44 (2012).
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agency interpretations should not be granted Chevron deference, leav-
ing the courts to apply mere Skidmore deference standards,127 but the
court soon threw such a bright-line rule into disarray.
In Mead, the Court also seemed to aver that “force of law” might
depend on the formality of process the agency used or was required by
statute to use, such that when Congress “provides for a relatively for-
mal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and delib-
eration that should underlie a pronouncement” with force of law, “[i]t
is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative
action with the effect of law . . . .”128  However, as if to muddy the
waters, the court also noted that “as significant as notice-and-com-
ment is in pointing to Chevron authority . . . we have sometimes found
reasons for Chevron deference, even when no such administrative for-
mality was required and none was afforded.”129  The Court cited Na-
tionsBank of N.C., N.A., where it upheld Chevron deference to an
opinion letter of a Senior Deputy Comptroller of the Comptroller of the
Currency.130  So, while “express congressional authorizations to en-
gage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regu-
lations or rulings” is “a very good indicator of delegation [by Congress]
meriting Chevron treatment,”131 it apparently might not be sufficient,
and might not even be necessary.  Still, in general, “if agencies have
been given power to use relatively formal procedures, and if they have
exercised that power, they are entitled to Chevron deference.”132
The courts have not been entirely clear as to why the formality of
procedure required of and employed by agencies should determine
whether to grant Chevron deference.  One basis is the legal fiction that
courts can assume congressional intent to delegate decision making
from its decision to require formal procedure by the agency.  Sunstein
posits that notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication
foster “fairness and deliberation” by “giving people an opportunity to
be heard and offering reasoned responses to what people have to
say.”133  Using the formality of an agency’s decision making at Step
Zero forces agencies to decide which they would rather have: a quick,
informal decision that would likely not be granted Chevron (but likely
Skidmore) deference and so could be easily overturned by a court, ver-
sus a much more labor-intensive decision-making process that must
include notice and the right to be heard and the necessity to provide
127. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588.
128. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
129. Id. at 230–31.
130. NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 263–64
(1995).
131. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
132. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 214.
133. Id. at 225.
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reasons for the decision, but one which leads to much greater defer-
ence by the courts.134
Agency determinations can fail at Step Zero regardless of the for-
mality of process the agency is entitled to employ or did in fact employ,
however, as there are also substantive aspects of Step Zero completely
separate from process concerns.  A primary substantive Step Zero ex-
ception is that of “major questions,” the idea that Congress would not
delegate fundamental aspects of law to the supervising agency with-
out being clear that it is doing so.  In Whitman, the Court stated this
almost poetically: “Congress, we have held, does not alter the funda-
mental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary pro-
visions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”135
Justice Breyer explained, “Congress is more likely to have focused
upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial mat-
ters to answer themselves in the course of the statute’s daily adminis-
tration.”136  For example, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., the court refused to defer to the FDA’s attempt to assert the
authority to regulate tobacco.137  The FDA had interpreted its author-
izing statute to give it power to include tobacco among the “drugs” and
“devices” it could regulate.138  The Court rejected this interpretation,
finding that Congress’s long history of not granting the FDA explicit
powers to regulate tobacco constituted evidence that it did not intend
to do so.  The Court added that “we are confident that Congress could
not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political
significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”139  The “major ques-
tions” exception to the Chevron delegation fiction is itself a fiction, of
course, as courts merely determine whether Congress theoretically
would have intended such delegation.
As others have noted, the “major question” test at Step Zero is
fraught with problems, both theoretical and practical.140  As should be
unsurprising for a fictional exception to the Chevron fiction, there are
many unresolved issues in the “major questions” element of Step Zero.
134. Id. at 225–26.
135. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).  Loshin and
Nielson state that “despite the voluminous literature on Chevron, the elephants-
in-mouseholes doctrine has not been identified or taken seriously as a doctrine.”
Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN.
L. REV. 19, 21 (2010).  In other words, elephants in mouseholes may be the dogs
that did not bark.
136. Breyer, supra note 89, at 370.
137. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
138. Id. at 126.
139. Id. at 160.
140. See Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1919
n.138 (2016) (“The major questions canon has never been invoked to constrain an
agency’s procedural choices, as opposed to its substantive statutory interpreta-
tion, and thus is barely relevant anyway.”).
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First is the difficulty in defining what questions are major.141  The
rarity of courts finding major questions makes their study difficult,
because “like a pickled monster, the rare and freakish major question
exception may make a dubious case study.”142  The Court has done
little to define or state rules for determining what constitutes a “major
question” justifying avoidance of Chevron deference.143  Is the dollar
amount at issue determinative?  Or is it how large the issue looms in
the agency’s work, so that what might seem minor to a large agency
would be major to a smaller one?  Alas, “[a]ttempts to interpret when
and how courts will rely upon the major questions line of cases become
murky when considering the limited instances when the Court has in-
voked the doctrine, and the cases whose facts would seemingly present
major questions but the courts decline to rely on the doctrine.”144
Sunstein notes that there is no reason that the size of the question
should undermine the notion that agencies have more expertise and
political accountability than courts, and agencies should be able to ap-
ply those attributes as effectively in major questions as in minor
ones.145  Moncrieff argues that the issue should not be whether the
question is “major” but rather whether the agency appears to inter-
rupt the status quo and interfere with “ongoing congressional bargain-
ing” in an area where Congress remains “actively interested.”146
Armstrong argues that an important aspect of the “major question”
issue is whether the agency is using its delegated interpretive power
in a self-interested attempt to increase the size of its own regulatory
jurisdiction.147
141. Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to Chevron
Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It
Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 618 (2008) (“[T]here must necessarily be some
threshold—some magnitude of importance, or sensitivity, or majorness of policy
questions—that triggers nondelegation concerns.  But no one actually knows
where that threshold lies.”).
142. Note, Major Question Objections, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2191, 2199 (2016).
143. Jonas J. Monast, Major Questions About the Major Questions Doctrine, 68 ADMIN.
L. REV. 445, 451 (2016) (“Similar to previous decisions relying on the doctrine, the
Burwell opinion did not explain the bounds of the major questions inquiry, pro-
viding little guidance for future applications.”).
144. Id. at 465.
145. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 232 (“At first glance, there is no reason to think that
the considerations that animate Chevron do not apply to large questions. . . .  The
agency’s expertise is certainly relevant to answering that question.  And to the
extent that issues of value are involved, it would appear best to permit the resolu-
tion of ambiguities to come from a politically accountable actor rather than the
courts.”).
146. Moncrieff, supra note 141, at 621.
147. Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 261 (2004) (“In these concluding paragraphs, the Court
rejected the agency’s assertion of jurisdiction precisely because it represented an
exercise in self-aggrandizement far beyond the scope of authority Congress likely
intended to delegate to the agency.”).
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The “major question” exception to Chevron deference has been di-
rectly called into question by the Court itself.  For example, in Barn-
hart v. Walton, the Court averred that “the importance of the question
to administration of the statute” is actually a factor in favor of grant-
ing Chevron deference, rather than against it.148  The most major
questions would therefore deserve the greatest deference.
In City of Arlington v. FCC, the Court faced directly the issue of
whether questions of an agency’s jurisdiction were necessarily so im-
portant (and prone to agency bias) that courts should not defer to an
agency’s interpretation.149  The Court seemed to drive a stake into the
heart of the “major question” doctrine, stating, “we have applied Chev-
ron where concerns about agency self-aggrandizement are at their ap-
ogee: in cases where an agency’s expansive construction of the extent
of its own power would have wrought a fundamental change in the
regulatory scheme.”150  While City of Arlington specifically concerned
agency jurisdiction, its direction to focus exclusively on whether the
agency strayed beyond its statutory authority seems to imply that the
significance and importance of the question should not determine
whether to grant Chevron deference.
V. THE APPLICATION OF CHEVRON IN KING V. BURWELL
A. Chevron and the Lead-Up to King v. Burwell
Before the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in King v.
Burwell, it seemed clear that an important issue would be whether
and how much deference to grant Treasury and the Internal Revenue
Service, which had issued regulations purporting to define the mean-
ing of “Exchange established by the State” to include federal and state
exchanges, not just those which states had set up and operated them-
selves.  Treasury and the IRS had followed notice-and-comment proce-
dure to promulgate those rules, likely at least in part to obtain as
much deference as possible from any court that would rule on the
meaning of those words.151  The level of deference could well have de-
termined the outcome of the case, and hence the fate of Obamacare, as
deferring to the IRS regulations would have upheld the interpretation
they contained.
148. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).  Seidenfeld notes, “If Mead is con-
fused, the Supreme Court’s later decision in Barnhart v. Walton is downright
perverse when viewed with a focus on congressional intent. Barnhart used fac-
tors that the Court had previously identified as relevant under the doctrine of
Skidmore deference to decide whether Chevron applied.”  Mark Seidenfeld, Chev-
ron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 280–81 (2011).
149. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
150. Id. at 1872.
151. Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell,
2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 56 (2015).
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The lower courts had been mixed in their rulings on whether to
defer to the IRS’s interpretation of the statute.152  One district court
in Virginia found that plaintiffs should lose at both Step One and Step
Two of Chevron.153  The court found that there was no ambiguity in
the statute, stating “While on the surface, Plaintiffs’ plain meaning
interpretation of section 36B has a certain common sense appeal, the
lack of any support in the legislative history of the ACA indicates that
it is not a viable theory.”154  The district court further found that
plaintiffs should lose even if they had made it to Chevron’s Step Two,
as even if there were ambiguity in the statute, the agency’s interpreta-
tion was not unreasonable.155  A D.C. district court found that the
statute unambiguously allowed tax subsidies in both federal and
state-operated exchanges, stating “In sum, the Court finds that the
plain text of the statute, the statutory structure, and the statutory
purpose make clear that Congress intended to make premium tax
credits available on both state-run and federally-facilitated Ex-
changes.”156  Because it found no ambiguity in the statute, that dis-
trict court did not consider whether the IRS’s interpretation was
reasonable under Step Two.
At the court of appeals stage, the circuits split.  The D.C. Circuit
found that the plain meaning of the ACA mandated that tax subsidies
were available only in state-operated exchanges, not federal ex-
changes, with no significant legislative history to the contrary.157  The
court stated that “the government offers no textual basis . . . for con-
cluding that a federally-established Exchange is, in fact or legal fic-
tion, established by a state.” 158  On the same day, the Fourth Circuit
found that the ACA was ambiguous on the crucial issue, noting that
the “the defendants have the stronger position, although only
slightly.”159  Finding the ACA ambiguous, the court proceeded to
Chevron Step Two and concluded that the IRS’s interpretation of the
statute was “sensible,” and so should be afforded deference. 160  The
court also cast aside the plaintiffs’ argument that aspects of the ACA
were administered by HHS and therefore the IRS’s interpretation
should not be granted deference.  The court noted that “the relevant
152. In addition to the district court cases described herein, a similar action challeng-
ing the validity of tax subsidies was pending in Indiana and survived a motion to
dismiss. See Indiana v. IRS, 38 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
153. King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415 (E.D. Va. 2014).
154. Id. at 431.
155. Id. at 432.
156. Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 2014).
157. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
158. Id. at 402.
159. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 369 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014).
160. Id. at 375 (“It is thus entirely sensible that the IRS would enact the regulations it
did, making Chevron deference appropriate.”).
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statutory language is found in 26 U.S.C. § 36B, which is part of the
Internal Revenue Code and subject to interpretation by the IRS” and
additionally “the Act clearly gives to the IRS authority to resolve am-
biguities in 26 U.S.C. § 36B.”161  Before certiorari was granted by the
Supreme Court, another district court weighed in, this time in
Oklahoma.  That court found the DC Circuit’s Halbig decision con-
vincing and held that, in tax credit cases, there was no “wiggle room”
for finding ambiguity because tax subsidies must be stated with “clear
and unambiguous language.”162
Surprisingly, in the hearing before the Supreme Court, Chevron
arguments received short shrift with two notable exceptions.  Justice
Kennedy remarked that the size of the issue in dollars of potential tax
subsidies indicated that courts rather than the federal agency should
make the decision regarding the meaning of the ACA, potentially re-
viving the “major questions” doctrine.163  Justice Roberts pointed out
a significant pitfall to the government relying on Chevron to defend
Obamacare, asking if the government relied on Chevron, and if “you’re
right about Chevron, that would indicate that a subsequent adminis-
tration could change that interpretation?”  The Solicitor General ar-
gued that a subsequent administration “would need a very strong case
under step two of the Chevron analysis that that was a reasonable
judgment in view of the disruptive consequences.”164  The Solicitor
General’s argument, however, seems to contradict the concept of
“Chevron space,” the idea that a court granting Chevron deference to
an agency interpretation does not restrict subsequent contradictory
agency interpretations.165  Instead, that argument shows the peril of
mandating Chevron space for such important issues, as permanently
unfettered agency discretion could lead to wildly swinging interpreta-
tive changes as presidential administrations change, and such
changes would be most problematic in areas that require stability, like
health insurance.
B. King v. Burwell and Chevron Step Zero
In its ruling, the Supreme Court made quick work of the Chevron
issue.  The Court first recited the usual two-step Chevron analysis for
161. Id.
162. Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Burwell, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1091 (E.D. Okla. 2014),
appeal held in abeyance, No. 14-7080, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24498 (10th Cir.
Nov. 19, 2014), cert denied, No. 14-586, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 773 (Jan. 26, 2015).
163. Kennedy stated, “But it seems to me a drastic step for us to say that the Depart-
ment of Internal Revenue and its director can make this call way or the other
when there are, what, billions of dollars of subsidies involved here?  Hundreds of
millions?”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 74, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114)
[hereinafter King Oral Argument].
164. Id. at 76.
165. See generally Strauss, supra note 121.
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deferring to agency interpretation in the face of statutory ambiguity,
then immediately cited FDA v. Brown & Williamson for the proposi-
tion that “[i]n extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to
hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an im-
plicit delegation.”166  With this, the Court announced that it consid-
ered this to be a Step Zero case.
The Court’s explanation of why this was a Step Zero “extraordi-
nary case” is itself extraordinarily terse.
The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, involving billions of dollars
in spending each year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions
of people.  Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a
question of deep “economic and political significance” that is central to this
statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency,
it surely would have done so expressly.  It is especially unlikely that Congress
would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in craft-
ing health insurance policy of this sort.  This is not a case for the IRS.167
In the context of this challenge to Obamacare’s tax subsidies, the
Court’s description of congressional intent is almost a non sequitur
and the Court’s decision virtually ipse dixit.  It seems clear that Con-
gress did not contemplate this challenge to the ACA, as even Obama-
care’s foes took months to notice that they could base a challenge on
the text at issue.  Justice Breyer, when writing about a different case,
stated, “Congressional silence here meant what congressional silence
usually means: not that Congress intended [the agency] to decide a
question of law, but that Congress never thought about the ques-
tion.”168  Most likely, members of Congress assumed that tax subsi-
dies would be available in all states and so had no wish or intent
concerning whether this question would be assigned to the IRS or to
the courts.  Seidenfeld noted, “[T]here are good reasons to believe that
Congress was unaware of the potential question regarding tax credits
on federally created Exchanges.” 169
From Congress’s failure, in its tumultuous passage of the ACA, ex-
pressly to assign the authority to determine this specific and in all
likelihood unforeseen question, it is difficult to derive the implication
that Congress did not wish courts to defer to Treasury’s and the IRS’s
interpretation of the statute.  Indeed, the statute includes the type of
delegation of rulemaking authority to Treasury that generally leads to
Chevron deference, as the relevant section of the ACA states that
“[t]he [Treasury] Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this section . . . .”170  As the
166. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
167. Id. at 2489 (citations omitted).
168. Breyer, supra note 89, at 376.
169. Seidenfeld, supra note 51, at 126.
170. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(g) (2012).
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Fourth Circuit had noted, “This clear delegation of authority to the
IRS relieves us of any possible doubt regarding the propriety of relying
on one agency’s interpretation of a single piece of a jointly-adminis-
tered statute.”  Congress clearly intended to give Treasury the inter-
pretive power to resolve ambiguities in this section of the ACA.  There
seems to be no basis for the Court’s claim that while Congress would
want the IRS to resolve ambiguities causing small problems, Congress
would want the IRS, and hence Treasury, to be powerless to resolve
ambiguities that could cause catastrophic problems.
The cases the Court cites for its discussion provide little support
for its conclusion.171 Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA concerned a
Chevron Step Two question (Is the agency’s interpretation permissi-
ble?) rather than a Step Zero question (Should Chevron deference even
apply?).172  In Utility Air, the Court was faced with a decision by the
EPA to regulate greenhouse gases based on a new reading of the
Clean Air Act.  The Court found that the EPA’s interpretation was not
permissible, stating, “When an agency claims to discover in a long-
extant statute an unheralded power to regulate ‘a significant portion
of the American economy,’ we typically greet its announcement with a
measure of skepticism.”173  There, the Court also noted that even the
EPA admitted that its new interpretation of a long-standing statute
would render that statute “unrecognizable to the Congress that de-
signed it.”174  Merrill explained, “In other words, the Court was en-
gaging in boundary maintenance through an aggressive application of
Step Two.”175  The Court in Utility Air appears to have found, there-
fore, that the agency’s novel reading of an old statute in a way that it
knew Congress would not have recognized was impermissible under
Chevron’s Step Two, as it was the substance of the interpretation and
171. Cory R. Liu, Chevron’s Domain and the Rule of Law, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 391,
404–05 (2016) (arguing that those cases cited differ from Court’s decision in King
“because they purported to follow the Chevron framework while examining the
magnitude of the statute’s policy implications.  By contrast, King addressed the
separate question of whether Chevron even applied in the first place—the ques-
tion of Chevron’s domain or Chevron Step Zero.”).
172. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446 (2014).  In Utility Air, the
Court began its analysis asking, “We first decide whether EPA permissibly inter-
preted the statute . . . .” Id. at 2439; see also Emily Hammond, Chevron’s Gener-
ality Principles, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 655, 663 (2014) (“It is perhaps curious that
the Court announced this interpretation at Step Two, rather than Step One; after
all, Step One is primarily directed at determining whether Congress intended to
delegate interpretive authority to the agency with regard to the precise question
at issue.”).
173. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2444 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
174. Id.
175. Merrill, supra note 106, at 756.
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the clash between the agency’s interpretation and the structure and
design of the statute that rendered it impermissible.176
Here, by comparison, the IRS and Treasury were handed a brand-
new statute that had been hurriedly crafted by Congress and were
given the thankless and inevitable task of creating regulations to fill
in and resolve the many gaps and inconsistencies in the legislation.  If
there was one piece of legislation that Congress should have predicted
and expected the federal agencies to have gaps to fill through regula-
tions, it would have been the ACA.  But rather than even consider the
substance of the IRS’s interpretation, the Court decided that the size
of the issue prevented the Court from deferring to the IRS’s
interpretation.
When the Court stated that it was unlikely that Congress would
have intended to delegate this decision to the IRS, “which has no ex-
pertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort,”177 it cited Gon-
zales v. Oregon,178 but did not seem to follow the analysis used in that
case.  In Gonzales, the Court refused to grant Chevron deference to an
interpretive rule issued by the Attorney General pursuant to the Con-
trolled Substances Act (CSA).179  That rule had declared the use of
controlled substances to aid suicide is unlawful under the CSA, not-
withstanding the permission granted in Oregon’s Death with Dignity
Act.  The Court began its analysis by noting how limited the delega-
tion of authority to the Attorney General was in the CSA, namely that
he can “promulgate rules relating only to ‘registration’ and ‘control,’
and ‘for the efficient execution of his functions’ under the statute.”180
The Court in Gonzales compared this limited delegation with more
general delegation authority giving “broad power,” such as when Con-
gress delegated to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
the authority to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be nec-
essary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of the [Com-
munications Act of 1934].”181  This broad delegation of authority to
the FCC is almost identical to the ACA’s delegation of authority to
Treasury, which states, “The Secretary shall prescribe such regula-
tions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this sec-
176. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2442. But see Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions about the
“Major Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479, 480 (2016) (argu-
ing that Utility Air does constitute an application of the “major questions”
doctrine).
177. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
178. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
179. Id. at 268 (“Since the Interpretive Rule was not promulgated pursuant to the
Attorney General’s authority, its interpretation of ‘legitimate medical purpose’
does not receive Chevron deference.” (citation omitted)).
180. Id. at 245 (citation omitted).
181. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 201(b)).
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tion . . . .”182  The Court in Gonzales also noted that this is the
language Congress employs precisely when it wants to delegate to an
agency broad authority over a statute, saying, “When Congress
chooses to delegate a power of this extent, it does so not by referring
back to the administrator’s functions but by giving authority over the
provisions of the statute he is to interpret.”183  While on a facile level,
the IRS regulating issues of health insurance appears similar to the
Attorney General regulating physician assisted suicide, the two cases
are very different in that the CSA strictly limited the Attorney Gen-
eral’s interpretive powers, whereas the ACA gives Treasury and the
IRS broad powers in the section at issue in this case.
The ACA not only gives Treasury and the IRS powers to prescribe
regulations in the section at issue, it also indicates a desire by Con-
gress that Treasury and HHS work together in administering the
ACA.  For example, the ACA requires the HHS Secretary “in consulta-
tion with the Secretary of the Treasury,” to establish a program of
advance notification of income eligibility and advance payments of
subsidies to health care plans.184  According to the notice of proposed
regulations, “The Departments of Health and Human Services and
Treasury are working in close coordination to release guidance related
to Exchanges, in several phases.”185  As evidence of their close cooper-
ation, the notice states that HHS and Treasury are collaborating on
numerous tasks, including “a Request for Comment relating to Ex-
changes,” an “Initial Guidance to States on Exchanges,” and “proposed
regulations on the application, review, and reporting process for waiv-
ers for State innovation.”186
Treasury and the IRS coordinated the regulation at issue here with
HHS regulations, producing definitions of the statutory term “Ex-
change” that were made consistent by Treasury’s regulation cross-
referencing the HHS definition of “Exchange” and its inclusion of fed-
erally facilitated exchanges.187  Since the passage of the ACA, Trea-
sury and the IRS have worked cooperatively with HHS to answer
many questions left by the ACA.188  Nor is it unusual for Treasury
182. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(g) (2012).
183. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 265.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 18082 (2012); see also 26 U.S.C. § 36B(g)(1) (2012) (requiring Trea-
sury to issue regulations for “coordination of the credit” allowed by § 36B, the
“program for advance payment of the credit” administered by HHS).
185. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 76 Fed. Reg. 50,931, 50,932 (Aug. 17,
2011) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
186. Id.
187. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-1(k) (2014) (“Exchange has the same meaning as in 45 CFR
§ 155.20.”).
188. Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717,
1731 (2014) (“Since the ACA’s enactment, Treasury and the IRS have worked
with HHS and the Department of Labor (Labor) to draft regulations that, among
other things, accommodate religious organizations that object to mandatory con-
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and the IRS to work with HHS on health care issues, as they previ-
ously did with health coverage requirements under ERISA, “regula-
tions concerning the length of hospital stays for new mothers and
their newborn infants” and parity for “mental health and substance
abuse disorder benefits provided by group health plans . . . .”189  How-
ever, the Court ignored the role of HHS in working with Treasury and
the expertise HHS could provide.  As Gluck notes, “[T]he IRS pig-
gybacked off of HHS’s interpretation—something the Court never
mentions.”190
The Court also ignored the longstanding policy of granting defer-
ence where agencies are handed a new set of laws to supervise and
have to make immediate and contemporaneous interpretations of
those laws in order to set up the program at issue.191  As the Court
had previously noted, “A regulation may have particular force if it is a
substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those
presumed to have been aware of congressional intent.”192  Further,
the IRS’s interpretation of tax issues in the tax code it administers is
generally subject to Chevron deference.193
The Court portrays the Obamacare question as merely whether the
IRS or the courts are better able to interpret the underlying stat-
ute.194  However, this portrayal ignores the fact that IRS and Trea-
sury worked with HHS and also that the President has broad
oversight over federal agencies.195  The courts should recognize the
traceptive coverage; elaborate the extent to which group health plans are pre-
cluded from denying coverage to individuals with preexisting health conditions;
and identify ways in which health insurance providers may or may not offer in-
centives for participating in wellness programs.”).
189. Id. at 1733.
190. Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s
Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 94 (2015).
191. Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827) (“In the construc-
tion of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those
who were called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provi-
sions into effect, is entitled to very great respect.”).
192. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) questioned
on other grounds by Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
193. Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct. at 713.
194. Lederman and Dugan note that the regulation at issue in King v. Burwell was
promulgated by the Treasury Department, not the IRS, and note that “the Su-
preme Court, Fourth Circuit, and Eastern District of Virginia each referred to it
as an ‘IRS Rule’” as did plaintiffs, while defendants insisted correctly it is a Trea-
sury regulation.  Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, King v. Burwell: What
Does It Portend for Chevron’s Domain?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 72, 73 & n.7 (2015).
195. Aaron Saiger, Chevron and Deference in State Administrative Law, 83 FORDHAM
L. REV. 555, 564 (“[F]ederal agencies are embedded in some fashion in the execu-
tive branch, in ways that create political accountability that is more direct than
that of federal courts.  Federal agency heads are clearly subject to the political
supervision of the President or his “administration” in some fashion. . . .”).
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President’s ability to coordinate the actions of multiple federal agen-
cies working in the same area, a coordination power that in some
cases provides some justification for Chevron deference.196  Here, it is
reductive and inaccurate to suggest that only the IRS was involved.
Worse yet, by bluntly stating that this is no case for the IRS, the Court
ignored that the statute in question required Treasury to “prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
this section . . . .”197  And so by tersely insisting that this is not a case
for the IRS, the Court reveals the central flaw of Step Zero and its
fictional exception to Chevron deference, how its fictional nature, ill-
defined and unfettered from actual congressional intent, has allowed
it to become a rule and doctrine-free zone where courts can, based on
little evidence or policy analysis, announce that they should be freed
of deferring to the agency’s decision.
C. King v. Burwell and Skidmore Deference
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Court’s deference deci-
sion is that, not only did it deny Chevron deference to the IRS’s inter-
pretation of the statute, it also utterly failed even to discuss whether
deference was owed to the IRS regulations under the Skidmore stan-
dard.  The Court merely announced that “[t]his is not a case for the
IRS.”198  The Court thus ignored whether in the absence of Chevron
deference, Skidmore deference should be applied.  By failing to discuss
Skidmore deference, the Court effectively denied Skidmore deference,
though it did so without stating its rationale.199  While it had for a
time been unclear whether Skidmore deference survived the Chevron
decision, the Court in Mead made clear that it did.200  As noted by
Claire Kelly, “Mead offered Skidmore as the ‘no Chevron’ consolation
prize.”201 Mead held that even if agency interpretations “do not fall
within Chevron,” that does not “place them outside the pale of any
deference whatever.”202  Healy noted, “Mead established that Chevron
review only applies when defined requirements are met and held that
196. Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of Law, and Presidential Influence
in the Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679, 695 (2014) (“The White
House is uniquely positioned atop the executive branch to spot coordination
problems among agencies.  I thus propose below that Chevron deference might
sometimes be deployed with a welcoming eye to presidential involvement, but
only when problems of coordination arise.”).
197. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(g) (2012).
198. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
199. Chabota, supra note 108, at 503.
200. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 232–35 (2001).
201. Claire R. Kelly, The Brand X Liberation: Doing Away with Chevron’s Second Step
as well as Other Doctrines of Deference, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151, 196 (2010)
(citation omitted).
202. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.
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so-called Skidmore deference applies when Chevron deference does
not apply.”203
Given that the level of deference courts should grant an agency
interpretation under Skidmore depends on “the thoroughness evident
in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control,” 204 had the Court ap-
plied Skidmore, it should likely have found that the IRS’s regulation
at issue was worthy of at least some deference.  While the IRS gener-
ally may not have great expertise on health insurance issues, here, the
IRS worked closely with HHS and with the White House in crafting a
regulatory framework for ACA, as rule drafters at Treasury and the
IRS “met regularly with White House officials, who were closely moni-
toring the drafting of the regulations . . . .”205  The resulting regula-
tions went through the notice-and-comment procedures.  Arguably,
the IRS could have done a significantly better job explaining its ratio-
nale for these regulations, such as explaining the policy rationale, but
it did offer some explanation.206
At the very least, the Court could have conducted a Skidmore anal-
ysis to determine how much, if any, deference to grant the IRS’s inter-
pretation.  Professor Murphy explained, “Skidmore . . . represents a
judgment that courts will produce better statutory constructions if
they avail themselves of agency ‘help’ by engaging agency reasoning in
a thoughtful manner.”207  Yet, the Court refused to engage agency
reasoning in even the most perfunctory manner, but instead seems to
have sweepingly decided, in the course of its Step Zero analysis, that
the IRS’s interpretation was worth no deference whatsoever.  The
Court seems to have applied Step Zero to Skidmore as well as Chevron
deference, though without discussion.  And so, Treasury and the IRS,
which worked closely with HHS in setting up the ACA regulatory re-
gime and then conducted a full notice-and-comment procedure for
their regulatory decision, were completely ignored by the Court as it
made a decision which could break or save Obamacare.  Instead, the
203. Healy, supra note 119, at 1–2.
204. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944).
205. Lisa Rein, Six Words Might Decide the Fate of Obamacare at the Supreme Court,




206. Sanders, supra note 5, at 1303 (“Additionally, the IRS could have articulated that
its reading is necessary for the Secretary to accomplish the task of providing tax
credits for coverage under all qualified health plans.”).
207. Richard W. Murphy, A “New” Counter-Marbury: Reconciling Skidmore Deference
and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2004).
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Court made its own way to reach the same conclusion that the IRS
and Treasury had, but without deferring to their guidance.208
By refusing to defer to the IRS, the Court in essence ignored the
entire Executive Branch in making its decision.  Because Congress
had granted the Secretary of the Treasury rulemaking authority for
the tax credit aspect of the ACA, and the Court decided that the IRS
was not up to snuff on interpreting tax credit aspects of the ACA, the
entire Obama administration was shut out of the final decision for this
important aspect of Obama’s signature legislation. Chevron can be
viewed as a mandate to allow the Executive Branch sway in interpret-
ing administrative statutes. King v. Burwell may be viewed as an
anti-Chevron, such that, in important cases and where the Court is
unimpressed by the agency delegated to administer the statute, courts
can simply ignore the clear congressional delegation of interpretive
power to an agency, disregard the agency’s interpretation, and substi-
tute the courts’ own interpretation at will.
After finding that “we cannot conclude that the phrase ‘an Ex-
change established by the State under [Section 18031]’ is unambigu-
ous,”209 the Court’s majority opinion essentially agreed with the IRS’s
interpretation of that portion of the statute.  Scalia in his dissent did
not dispute the refusal to grant the IRS deference.  Instead, Scalia
considered the disputed language of the statute unambiguously to ap-
ply only to exchanges established by the states, and not federal ex-
changes, and so he would not have deferred to the IRS for a completely
different reason.210
One might think that the Court’s refusing to grant the IRS defer-
ence, but then reaching the same conclusion as that of Treasury and
the IRS, likely makes any defects in its deference analysis relatively
harmless in the case itself.  And perhaps the terseness of its deference
discussion was an attempt to minimize any harm that the analysis
might cause.  The Court’s decision, however, has arguably damaged
the functioning of the ACA, given that Congress delegated to the Sec-
retary of the Treasury the power to make regulations regarding tax
subsidies and the Court ruled that at least some of Treasury and the
IRS’s regulations pursuant to that delegation hold no weight with the
Court.  While the Court’s decision was based on the “major question”
doctrine, many of the issues involved in such a massive program as
the ACA will inevitably require answering questions with huge
amounts of money and many insured at issue.  Treasury and the IRS
could continue to issue regulations pursuant to the ACA’s congres-
sional delegation, but each regulation that is aimed at health insur-
ance will have a shadow cast over it, a shadow that working with HHS
208. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
209. Id. at 2493 (citation omitted).
210. Id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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does not seem to dispel.  Congress could itself dispel this shadow by
making a clearer expression of delegation of interpretive authority to
Treasury and the IRS, but given the notable hostility to the ACA by
Republicans and the current make-up of Congress, it is unlikely to
engage in this kind of minor fix to make Obamacare function more
effectively.
VI. HOW CHEVRON’S FICTIONS LEAD TO CHEVRON’S
CONFUSION
]A. The Fictional Basis of Chevron
Many have commented on the fictional nature of the Chevron dele-
gation,211 including several Supreme Court Justices, either during or
before their tenure on the court.212 Chevron employs the fiction that
211. Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867,
1876 (2015) (“But it is hard to find anyone who does not consider congressional
delegation a fiction.”); John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1911, 1932 (2015) (“Yet whatever the background legislative understanding
about deference and delegation may once have been, it would be facetious for
judges today to treat the availability of deference as a question of genuine legisla-
tive intent.”); Chabota, supra note 108, at 507 (“Step One of Chevron, however,
addresses this concern using a legal fiction.  The test assumes Congress intended
to grant an agency primary interpretive authority whenever a statute it adminis-
ters is ambiguous or silent.”); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58
DUKE L.J. 549, 562 (2009) (“Perhaps, then, it is no wonder that a wide range of
legal scholars have characterized the congressional delegation rationale for Chev-
ron as a fiction.”); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Con-
gressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2009 (2011) (“The framework for
judicial review of agency statutory interpretation rests on a legal fiction: Con-
gress intends to delegate interpretive authority to federal agencies whenever it
fails to resolve clearly the meaning of statutory language.”) Abbe R. Gluck, What
30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory Interpretation, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 613 (2014) (“[I]n contrast to most of the other interpretive
rules, there is widespread agreement about Chevron’s source: the Court created
the doctrine.”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations,
Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735,
749 (2002) (“Chevron deference revolves around the fiction of a congressional del-
egation . . . .”); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say
What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2590 (2006) (“In Chevron, the Court re-
placed that case-by-case inquiry with a simple rule, to the effect that delegations
of rule-making power implicitly include the power to interpret ambiguities.  But
as Justices Breyer and Scalia have independently emphasized, this is a legal fic-
tion; usually the legislature has not expressly conferred that power at all.”).
212. Breyer, supra note 89, at 370 (“For the most part courts have used ‘legislative
intent to delegate the law-interpreting function’ as a kind of legal fiction.”);
Scalia, supra note 1, at 517 (“In the vast majority of cases I expect that Congress
neither (1) intended a single result, nor (2) meant to confer discretion upon the
agency, but rather (3) didn’t think about the matter at all.  If I am correct in that,
then any rule adopted in this field represents merely a fictional, presumed intent,
and operates principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can
legislate.”); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine,
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any gap in a statute administered by an agency constitutes an implicit
delegation of interpretive power to federal agencies.213  Then-Profes-
sor Kagan and Professor Barron stated, “Because Congress so rarely
makes its intentions about deference clear, Chevron doctrine at most
can rely on a fictionalized statement of legislative desire, which in the
end must rest on the Court’s view of how best to allocate interpretive
authority.”214  Moglin and Pierce describe how Chevron’s implicit del-
egation is a fiction based on fictional policy.  They argue not only that
the implicit delegation is itself a fiction, but also fictional is the idea
that “the politically accountable President will control those policy de-
cisions Congress has declined to make through his control over the
agencies.”215  They note dryly, “In this political environment, Con-
gress rarely ‘intends’ to give the President greater policymaking
power.”216  Manning recently asserted, “In no opinion has the Court
premised its application of Chevron on the existence of legislative his-
tory suggesting that Congress preferred or disfavored a deferential ap-
proach under a given organic act.”217  Congress could clearly make its
intent regarding court deference to agency interpretation but chooses
rarely to do so.218
The fictional nature of the Chevron delegation is hard-wired into
the Chevron decision itself.  First, the Court notes that where Con-
gress has “explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,” then the delega-
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 224 n.85 (2001) (citing Breyer’s observation on the fiction
of Chevron).
213. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 193, 223–28 (“Any reading of congressional instruc-
tions on the deference question is inevitably fictive; it is not a matter of finding
something actual and concrete.”); see also Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D.
Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235,
1249 (2007) (“Chevron relies on an admittedly fictional presumption that Con-
gress chose an agency rather than the courts to be the primary interpreter of a
given statutory scheme.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 148, at 278 (“By most accounts,
Congress does not directly address the question of which institution—agency or
court—is authorized to fill gaps or resolve ambiguities in the vast majority of
regulatory statutes.  In that sense, congressional intent about interpretive pri-
macy is a fiction.”); Merrill, supra note 106, at 759 (“Even Chevron’s most enthu-
siastic champions admit that the idea of an ‘implied delegation’ is a fiction.”);
William R. Andersen, Against Chevron—A Modest Proposal, 56 ADMIN. L. REV.
957, 963 (2004) (“Few believe, however, there is any actual intentional delegation
in these cases—we are dealing instead with a convenient fiction.”).
214. Barron & Kagan, supra note 212, at 212.
215. Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein’s New Canons: Choosing the Fic-
tions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1212–13 (1990) (“Both
premises are fictional in most cases.”).
216. Id. at 1213.
217. Manning, supra note 211, at 1932.
218. Barron & Kagan, supra note 212, at 212 (“Although Congress can control applica-
tions of Chevron, it almost never does so, expressly or otherwise; most notably, in
enacting a standard delegation to an agency to make substantive law, Congress
says nothing about the standard of judicial review.”).
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tion of authority is express and clear.219  “Sometimes the legislative
delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather
than explicit,” the Court states, and that word “implicit” reveals the
fiction of congressional delegation where Congress never explicitly
mandated it.220  Upon finding a gap in the statute, courts should as-
sume that Congress intended to delegate the gap-filling to the agency,
even if there is no evidence that such intent exists.  Why Congress left
the gap is unimportant.  Whether Congress intentionally left a gap
because it intended the agency to work out the details, or instead be-
cause it did not consider the question at issue, or because it was una-
ble to decide the question, courts should act as if Congress intended
gaps to signify delegation of interpretive power to agencies, because,
the Court notes, “For judicial purposes, it matters not which of these
things occurred.”221  With these words, the Court acknowledges the
fiction.
As many have argued, the Chevron delegation of interpretive
power seems to fly directly in the face of the APA. 222  Section 706 of
the APA requires “the reviewing court” to “decide all relevant ques-
tions of law,” and “interpret constitutional and statutory provi-
sions . . . .”223  Patrick Smith has noted that the APA does not
condition its mandate that judges “interpret . . . statutory provision[s]”
on whether there exists an agency interpretation.224  Sunstein agrees,
stating, “In terms of the standard sources of law, Chevron’s fiction is
not at all easy to defend.  As noted, the text of the APA appears to
contemplate independent review of judgments of law.”225  Sunstein
further points out that if Congress, in passing the APA, had wanted it
to include anything like Chevron deference, surely someone would
have stated as much during the extensive debates during the APA’s
creation.226
The Chevron decision itself fails even to mention the APA, as if not
to puncture the fiction it created.227 Chevron seems to require courts
219. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
220. Id. at 844.
221. Id. at 865.
222. See generally Patrick J. Smith, Chevron’s Conflict with the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 32 VA. TAX REV. 813 (2013) (arguing that the conflict between Chevron
and the APA’s requirement that courts interpret statutes is unlikely to result in
the Supreme Court’s overruling Chevron but should induce courts to engage in
more robust analysis in each Chevron step); John F. Duffy, Administrative Com-
mon Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, (1998) (arguing Chevron ap-
pears to violate the APA).
223. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
224. Smith, supra note 222, at 819.
225. Sunstein, supra note 211, at 2590.
226. Id.
227. In discussing Chevron, Sunstein notes, “Strikingly, the Court did not discuss the
language or history of the APA.”  Id. at 2586.
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to violate the express provisions of the APA in order to mandate defer-
ence nowhere discussed in the APA.  As Eskridge and Baer state, “No-
where does the APA suggest that courts are required to defer to
agency interpretations of law.  If Chevron is a revolution, it is one
seeking to overturn the APA as well as almost two centuries of consti-
tutional understandings.”228
Some have argued that Chevron’s delegation does not violate the
APA because courts following Chevron do still interpret the law, but
merely do so through the Chevron lens, and that deferring to an
agency’s interpretation constitutes interpretation.  Under this argu-
ment, “the court does interpret the statute de novo; the court just finds
that the statute gives the agency the power to make the rule of deci-
sion.”229  However, an interpretation that Chevron forces on courts
seems hardly a free de novo decision by those courts.
Some have argued that, while the Chevron delegation may have
started as a fiction, because Congress has acquiesced to it, that acqui-
escence has imbued Chevron with an element of genuine congressional
intent.  For example, Barnett discusses how Congress, in the
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd–Frank), regarding banking reform, directly addressed Chevron
versus Skidmore deference.230  Dodd–Frank included an express elim-
ination of Chevron deference for the decisions of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regarding the preemption of state
regulation of banks and replaced it with what is essentially Skidmore
deference.231  Barnett argues that this express mandate of Skidmore
deference demonstrates that Congress is aware of Chevron deference
and that “Dodd-Frank suggests that Congress does in fact have intent
as to interpretive primacy, generally accepts judicial deference to
agency interpretations and the Chevmore regimes, and uses Chevron
as a background norm when drafting.”232
The history of Dodd–Frank and the congressional response to the
financial crisis of 2008, caused in part by the rogue operations of sub-
prime lenders given freedom from state law by the preemption deci-
sions of the OCC and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), as well as
228. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 103 at 1160.
229. Duffy, supra note 222, at 198.
230. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(c) (2012).
231. In their review of the OCC’s determinations to preempt state law, courts are
mandated to “assess the validity of such determinations, depending upon the
thoroughness evident in the consideration of the agency, the validity of the rea-
soning of the agency, the consistency with other valid determinations made by
the agency, and other factors which the court finds persuasive and relevant to its
decision.”  12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (2012).  This is in essence Skidmore deference.
Raymond Natter & Katie Wechsler, Dodd-Frank Act and National Bank Preemp-
tion: Much Ado About Nothing, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 301, 359 (2012).
232. Barnett, supra note 82, at 6–7.
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the paucity of other examples of express codification of Chevron or
Skidmore deference standards, arguably demonstrates the opposite,
however.  By preempting state regulation of federally regulated
banks, the federal OCC and OTS stopped states from reining in the
excesses and bad lending of those banks and their affiliates.233  The
push-back by states against such aggressive preemption was enor-
mous, with fifty states’ attorneys general sending a letter opposing
such preemption, and they were joined by state bank regulators and
members of Congress,234 as well as numerous academics235 and con-
sumer advocates.236  Rather than demonstrating that Congress uses
Chevron as a “deference norm” when drafting legislation, Dodd–Frank
is a rare example of Congress addressing deference, and so indicates
only that Congress can be pushed actively to consider deference stan-
dards by dire circumstances and sustained advocacy for a specific def-
erence standard.
233. See generally Kurt Eggert, Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab: Dodd-Frank,
Preemption, and the State Role in Mortgage Servicing Regulation, 15 CHAP. L.
REV. 171, 173–74 (2011).
234. Letter from the National Association of Attorneys General (Oct. 6, 2003), http://
agportal-s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploadedfiles/Home/News/Press_Releases/
2009/OCC%20Comments100603.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/2BFH-FBTZ].  Eager
& Muckenfuss noted in 2004, “State response to the OCC has been swift and
forceful.  In comments on the OCC rules, in litigation, and in Congressional over-
sight hearings, state bank regulators, state attorneys general, groups, and mem-
bers of Congress have decried the effects of these rules on the dual banking
system and federalism and questioned the wisdom and authority of the OCC.”
Robert C. Eager & C. F. Muckenfuss, III, Federal Preemption and the Challenge
to Maintain Balance in the Dual Banking System, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 21, 21–24
(2004) (citations omitted).
235. See, e.g., Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to Na-
tional Bank Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 981 (2006); Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and
Predatory Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More
Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 543 (2007); Elizabeth R. Schlitz,
Damning Watters: Channeling the Power of Federal Preemption of State Con-
sumer Banking Laws, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 893 (2008); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious
Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 247–53 (2004).
236. Multiple consumer advocacy groups and advocates also opposed such preemption.
See Letter to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Oct. 6, 2003), http://
www.responsiblelending.org/media-center/press-releases/archives/CRL-OCC-
signon100603.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/HD2J-R8NZ]; Margot Saunders & Alys
Cohen, Federal Regulation of Consumer Credit: The Cause or the Cure for Preda-
tory Lending? (Harvard University Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud., Working Paper No.
BABC 04-21, March 2004), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/
files/babc_04-21.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/8VGW-WKE5]; Edmund Mierzwin-
ski, Preemption of State Consumer Laws: Federal Interference Is a Market Fail-
ure, 6 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N GOV’T L. & POL’Y J. 6 (2004), http://www.pirg.org/
consumer/pdfs/mierzwinskiarticlefinalnysba.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/B4CB-
CUDP].
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Empirical work on what drafters of legislation consider regarding
delegation doctrine indicates that congressional staffers may be aware
of Chevron, but that knowledge does not indicate acquiescence that
would justify Chevron’s fiction.  A small study based on interviews
with staffers for the Senate Judicial Committee responsible for legis-
lative drafting indicated that, while they may know of the Chevron
doctrine and other canons of construction, such canons did not loom
large in the drafting of legislation.237
A larger study found that, while there is a feedback loop on Chev-
ron in that many of those staffers responsible for drafting legislation
know of the Chevron doctrine, that loop is only partial and does not
support the fiction that Congress implicitly delegates.  Gluck and
Bressman surveyed 137 congressional staffers from multiple commit-
tees and found that many staffers knew of Chevron and the possibility
that agencies would fill in the gaps left in statutes, but that this
knowledge was only one of several causes of ambiguity in statutes,
such as “lack of time,” “the complexity of the issue,” and “the need for
consensus.”238  They note that “most of our respondents told us that
their knowledge of Chevron does not mean that they intend to dele-
gate whenever ambiguity remains in finalized statutory language.  In-
stead, they told us that, although ambiguity sometimes signals intent
to delegate, often it does not, and Chevron is not a reason that drafters
leave statutes ambiguous.”239 Chevron’s primary effect on the staffers
seems to be forcing them to think about the level of specificity re-
quired in a statute and to push for more specificity when they want an
agency to perform in a certain way.240  Gluck and Bressman conclude,
“Chevron is a feedback canon that does not well approximate how Con-
gress drafts.”241  In other words, Chevron is a mere “judicial construc-
tion” and a fiction.242
237. Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 600–01 (2002) (“By and large,
however, staffers did not view canons as a central factor in drafting legislation
nor did there appear to be any systematic mechanism or practice for anticipating
which canons might be applied in construing a particular term in a bill.” (cita-
tions omitted)).
238. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the In-
side—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Ca-
nons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 997 (2013).
239. Id. at 996.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Barron & Kagan, supra note 212, at 212.
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B. Chevron’s Stare Decisis Muddle and the Need for “Sticky
Deference”
One reason the Court may have chosen not to defer to agency inter-
pretation in Burwell is concern that giving any deference to the IRS’s
interpretation would leave open the possibility that a new administra-
tion could reinterpret the phrase “an Exchange established by the
State” and refuse to grant tax subsidies in states with a federally oper-
ated exchange.243  Had the Court applied Chevron deference, a later
court could grant Chevron deference to new, contradictory agency in-
terpretation given the space for reinterpretation that current Chevron
doctrine mandates.244
Chevron created tension between its fictional deference and the
principle of stare decisis.245  Stare decisis regarding statutory inter-
pretation has been considered an especially strong doctrine, described
as “super strong stare decisis,” with courts locked into previous deci-
sions with the idea that “once a court speaks on a statutory matter, it
is up to Congress, in the interest of legislative supremacy, to decide
how to react.”246  However, courts could not insist on the binding na-
ture of their own decisions while at the same time deferring to subse-
quent agency interpretation.  Working out the relationship between
Chevron deference and stare decisis has been vexing, given the fic-
tional nature of Chevron deference.  If Congress explicitly stated in a
statute that courts should defer to agency interpretation of that stat-
ute, it would be clear that the agency would still be free to reinterpret
that state even after a court had followed a previous interpretation.
Subsequent courts would, pursuant to the statute, be required to fol-
low, within reason, subsequent agency reinterpretation.247
The effect of stare decisis in the face of subsequent court reinter-
pretation is not as clear for fictional deference.  In the 1990 case Mais-
lin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., involving a long-
standing statute, the Interstate Commerce Act, the Court had refused
to grant Chevron deference to an agency interpretation that would
have overturned century-old court doctrine, stating, “Once we have
determined a statute’s clear meaning, we adhere to that determina-
tion under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency later
243. Gluck, supra note 190, at 71–72 (“Deference to the agency would have meant that
a future IRS could have changed the rule at issue in King: such a holding would
have kept the King debate alive, and the ACA’s future would have continued to be
in doubt.”).
244. Strauss, supra note 121, at 1145 (“ ‘Chevron space’ denotes the area within which
an administrative agency has been statutorily empowered to act in a manner that
creates legal obligations or constraints—that is, its delegated or allocated
authority.”).
245. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
246. Gluck, supra note 211, at 626.
247. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
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interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the
statute’s meaning.”248  The Court noted that Congress had not over-
turned its long-standing interpretation and so declined “to revisit it
ourselves” despite the new agency interpretation.249
In 1996, the Court further buttressed stare decisis against chang-
ing agency interpretation in Neal v. United States,250 concerning what
deference to grant to the United States Sentencing Commission re-
garding the method to calculate the weight of LSD.  After noting the
limits to the Commission’s powers and the confusing nature of its stat-
utory interpretation, the Court held that it did not need to determine
what deference to afford the Commission because the Commission’s
interpretation contradicted the Court’s previous ruling, and while the
Commission may change its interpretation of statute, the Court does
“not have the same latitude to forsake prior interpretations of a stat-
ute.”251  The Court presented itself as shackled to precedent and una-
ble to respond to changing agency interpretation because, “[w]ere [the
Court] to alter [its] statutory interpretations from case to case, Con-
gress would have less reason to exercise its responsibility to correct
statutes that are thought to be unwise or unfair.”252  Rather than
presenting the issue as who should decide, the Court or the agency,
the Court presented both as helplessly shackled by stare decisis
through a “simple, mandatory rule.”253
The Court dramatically altered the relationship between Chevron
deference and stare decisis in the 2005 Brand X case.254  In Brand X,
the Ninth Circuit had refused to grant Chevron deference to agency
interpretation, a refusal based on that court’s previous contradictory
interpretation of the statute at issue and the court’s previous decision
based on that interpretation.255  The Ninth Circuit noted that its pre-
vious decision had not included a finding of ambiguity and absent
such a finding found that no deference need be granted to the agency’s
change in policy.256  Under the Ninth Circuit’s decision, then, so long
as courts do not expressly find a statute ambiguous, their own judicial
248. Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990).
249. Id. The holding in Maislin was subsequently followed but not extended or clari-
fied by the Court in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).  See discussion
of this point in Paul A. Dame, Note, Stare Decisis, Chevron, and Skidmore: Do
Administrative Agencies Have the Power to Overrule Courts?, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 405, 422 (2002).
250. 516 U.S. 284 (1996).
251. Id. at 295.
252. Id. at 296.
253. Pierce, supra note 102, at 2251.
254. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
255. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003).
256. Id. (“Furthermore, while we never explicitly stated in Portland that our interpre-
tation of the Act was the only one possible, we never said the relevant provisions
of the Act were ambiguous.”).
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interpretation of that statute would have the effect of freezing the
court’s interpretation and preventing the agency from later changing
it.
In Brand X, the Supreme Court turned that argument around and
held that because the Court of Appeal had not directly found the stat-
ute unambiguous, the agency was still free to reinterpret the statute,
and the agency’s new reinterpretation could still be awarded Chevron
deference.257  The Court held that because “the agency remains the
authoritative interpreter (within the limits of reason)” of the statutes
it administers, it should remain free to reinterpret that statute even
after a court has signed off on the agency’s previous interpretation.258
Only if a court finds the statute unambiguous, and thus not open to
agency interpretation on that point, does the court’s decision prevent
future agency reinterpretation.259  As Justice Scalia wrote in a later
concurring decision, “In cases decided pre-Brand X, the Court had no
inkling that it must utter the magic words ‘ambiguous’ or ‘unambigu-
ous’ in order to (poof!) expand or abridge executive power, and (poof!)
enable or disable administrative contradiction of the Supreme
Court.”260  As Slocum noted, “Courts attempting to conduct the Brand
X [sic] analysis will find daunting the challenges of attempting to de-
termine whether the earlier court asserted that its construction was
the only reasonable one and if its discussion was a holding or
dicta.”261
Even providing Skidmore deference regarding Obamacare would
put the Supreme Court in an awkward situation if a subsequent Re-
publican administration attempted to issue regulations that would
forbid tax subsidies in states without a state operated exchange.  In
the inevitable litigation, the new administration’s advocates could
trumpet that the Court deferred to the previous administration’s in-
terpretation, so why not to the new one? Skidmore deference could,
theoretically, lead to the same weak stare decisis as Chevron defer-
ence, and a subsequent court might be swayed by a new interpretation
by an agency of an ambiguous statute where the previous judicial de-
termination was based on Skidmore deference.  The Court seems to
have addressed the tension between stare decisis and Skidmore defer-
257. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982 (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute
trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if
the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous
terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”).
258. Id. at 983.
259. Id. at 982.
260. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1846 (2012)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
261. Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare
Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative
State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 846 (2010).
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ence only in dicta in Brand X, stating, “[T]he court’s prior ruling re-
mains binding law (for example, as to agency interpretations to which
Chevron is inapplicable).”262  Furthermore, “lower courts appear to
have held uniformly that stare decisis trumps an agency interpreta-
tion of an unclear statute unless and until the agency issues regula-
tions to the contrary that earn Chevron deference.”263
Academics, however, are not so sure.  Hickman and Krueger note
that “Skidmore deference shares the same tension with stare decisis
as Chevron previously did,” and argue that it might be wise to resort
to Skidmore deference in the face of conflicting courts of appeals deci-
sions.264  Professor Galle might go further, having expressed the belief
that “it is inevitable that there soon will be a Brand X for the Skid-
more doctrine.  Given the disadvantages of complete inflexibility for
courts, agencies, and the public, and the sheer doctrinal complexity of
determining which of the courts’ hundreds of pre-Chevron decisions
should be subject to Brand X, the Supreme Court will face enormous
pressure to treat both forms of deference similarly.”265  Others disa-
gree.266  However, a future ruling that Skidmore deference allows
agencies to reinterpret Obamacare despite stare decisis would throw
the Court’s Obamacare decision into question were it to rely on Skid-
more deference.
262. Id. at 983; see also Ryan H. Nelson, Sexual Orientation Discrimination under
Title VII after Baldwin v. Foxx, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 255, 271 (2015)
(citing Kenneth A. Manaster, Justice Stevens, Judicial Power, and the Varieties of
Environmental Litigation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1963, 2006 (2006) (“Accordingly,
the Court seems to be acknowledging, albeit in passing, judicial power to articu-
late ‘binding law’ on the basis of ambiguous statutes in some cases.”)).
263. Nelson, supra note 262, at 271.
264. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 213, at 1304–05 (2007) (“Likewise, one can imag-
ine that an agency might attempt to resolve a disagreement in the courts of ap-
peals over a particular interpretation question by issuing an official, thoroughly
considered but nonbinding notice of its intent to adopt one of the competing, rea-
sonable interpretations.  Perhaps the courts would be wise in deferring under
Skidmore to the agency’s application of its expertise in such situations rather
than insisting rigidly upon adherence to judicial precedent absent notice-and-
comment rulemaking.”).
265. Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 2001
n.285 (2008).
266. Robin Kundis Craig, Agencies Interpreting Courts Interpreting Statutes: The Def-
erence Conundrum of a Divided Supreme Court, 61 EMORY L.J. 1, 41–42 (2011)
(“In contrast, lesser standards of deference do not demand that a court give up its
prerogative to discern the ‘best’ interpretation of a statute.  For example, under
Skidmore deference, an agency interpretation receives deference only to the ex-
tent that it has the ‘power to persuade.’”); Slocum, supra note 261, at 845 (“It is
uncertain, but may be unlikely, that an authoritative agency interpretation that
is eligible for Skidmore, but not Chevron, deference can displace a judicial inter-
pretation that was made in the absence of an agency interpretation.”).
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Furthermore, if the Court had decided King v. Burwell based on
Skidmore deference, a subsequent court could potentially reach a dif-
ferent decision if it found that Chevron deference were warranted.
Bressman noted, “Brand X concerned a prior judicial interpretation
issued in the absence of any agency interpretation, rather than one
issued in the presence of an agency interpretation that merits Skid-
more deference and not Chevron deference.  But the holding in Brand
X should apply to the latter as well as the former.”267
The hazard of any deference, therefore, could be the instability of a
“final decision” on Obamacare by the Supreme Court that could be
later overturned by agency reinterpretation under a different presi-
dential administration.  Where a court rules based on Chevron defer-
ence, as noted by Strauss, “it decides the case but does not fix
statutory meaning.”268  To immunize its decision from subsequent
“overruling” by agency reinterpretation that would be entitled to
Chevron deference, a court would need to find that the terms of the
statute are unambiguous, a high bar indeed.269  This kind of instabil-
ity would lead to “disruptive consequences,” as noted by the Solicitor
General during oral argument.270  Imagine the challenges that insur-
ance companies would face in planning for the future if tax subsidies
could suddenly be deemed unavailable in half of the states.
King v. Burwell demonstrates the hazards of directly linking the
stare decisis effect of a court’s decision with a court’s finding (or not) of
ambiguity and the deference standard employed by the court.  Scalia
had noted the flaw this linkage caused when employed on decisions
issued by pre-Brand X courts unaware of that linkage.271  Those
courts in all likelihood did not realize that they must find a statute
unambiguous in order to convey strong stare decisis upon their result-
ing decision.
This problem survives even among courts that are aware of the
Brand X linkage of stare decisis with ambiguity, however, as demon-
strated by King v. Burwell.  The Court was confronted with a clearly
ambiguous statute, given that the exact text at issue seemed to refer
to tax subsidies available in exchanges that states had set up, while
the entire model of Obamacare indicated that those tax subsidies
must be available in both federal and state exchanges.  Under Brand
267. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Ac-
tion, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1467 n.157 (2005).
268. Strauss, supra note 121, at 1169.
269. Id. at 1172 (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court deci-
sion holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the stat-
ute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”).
270. Oral Argument in King, supra note 163, at 76.
271. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1846 (2012)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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X, a finding of ambiguity mandates weak stare decisis (for Chevron
deference), unless a Step Zero escape hatch can be found, but even
Skidmore deference may cause stare decisis problems.  Here, the
Court apparently recognized the need for strong stare decisis to decide
this question permanently so that Obamacare’s stability could be as-
sured, at least as to this issue.  And so, the Court avoided deference
entirely, and appeared compelled to ignore the valuable work that the
IRS and Treasury had done in creating their regulation and analyzed
the result de novo.
The linkage of strong stare decisis to unambiguity appears to be
more a product of blindly following the fiction of delegation rather
than a policy-based decision by courts.  It would seem regularly bene-
ficial to delink stare decisis and findings of ambiguity.  Just as the
Chevron doctrine needs an escape hatch so that courts can ignore its
fictional deference where necessary, so too should there be an escape
hatch for the evisceration of stare decisis for courts’ decisions based on
Chevron, where necessary.  For example, courts should recognize the
importance of creating a stable and permanent interpretation for am-
biguous statutory language where the needs for permanence outweigh
the benefits of providing Chevron space for reinterpretation.272
At the same time, a court might, in its decision, benefit by defer-
ring to the agency’s interpretation, based on the agency’s expertise
and effort in creating that interpretation.  Courts recognizing this di-
lemma (finding that ambiguity threatens stare decisis for the result-
ing opinion) should be given a way to discern ambiguity, defer to
agency interpretation in resolving that ambiguity, and still announce
that the needs of permanence require that their decisions be given
agency-proof stare decisis effect, rendering them immune to subse-
quent agency reinterpretation. King v. Burwell is such a case where
the Court should have been able to render a permanent and agency-
proof decision on the issue of tax subsidies, while still deferring to the
considered interpretation offered by the IRS and Treasury, because
Obamacare and the national health insurance system would be se-
verely weakened by a Supreme Court decision that invited great and
contradictory reinterpretations of this provision by subsequent
administrations.
Skidmore deference leads to something very like this result but is
dependent on finding a Step Zero escape hatch.  It makes more sense
to think of the policy behind different stare decisis regimes separately
from the deference fictions so that the stare decisis results are not
determined by the deference fictions unintended for that purpose.
What is needed, therefore, is a form of “sticky deference,” deference
272. This is not the same issue as whether there is a “major question,” as the need for
permanence may arise in smaller and larger questions.
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that a court announces will have a stare decisis effect able to with-
stand changing agency interpretation despite a finding of ambiguity
and one-time deference to agency interpretation.  Once a court an-
nounces that it intends its decision to have sticky deference, agencies
would  no longer be free to reinterpret the ambiguous language at is-
sue and the court’s decision would be binding unless overruled by a
higher court or overturned by Congress.
There are hazards to sticky deference, of course, and perhaps it
should be used sparingly.  Courts, if given the power to bind agencies
to the courts’ decisions, could well over-use that power, and so eviscer-
ate the utility of Chevron’s mandate giving primacy in certain circum-
stances to agency over court interpretation.  However, courts are free
to do that already, using Step Zero, as the Court did in King v.
Burwell, to avoid deference and agency reinterpretation altogether.
Sticky deference would lead to the same result without the play-acting
of finding a Step Zero rationale for strong stare decisis and would
force courts to deal with the policy rationales for the stare decisis ef-
fect of their decisions directly while still deferring to agency interpre-
tation where appropriate.
Sticky deference would work for stare decisis much like Step Zero
should for Chevron.  Where strong policy arguments dictate that the
fiction of Chevron deference should give way, Step Zero allows courts
to ignore the mandates of Chevron deference.  Similarly, where strong
policy arguments indicate that, even in the face of Chevron deference,
future fictional deference should give way, courts should be free to in-
sist on strong stare decisis for their decisions, and their decisions
should be respected by future courts despite Chevron.  A better under-
standing of legal fictions would help courts understand how to distin-
guish between an actual congressional delegation of interpretative
power to agencies, which must be respected, and fictional Chevron del-
egation, thus allowing courts to craft distinct rules for each type of
delegation
VII. LEGAL FICTIONS: THEIR FORGOTTEN HISTORY AND
MISUNDERSTOOD USE
A. The History and Evolution of Legal Fiction
Chevron is built on interlocking legal fictions, even though legal
fictions are little studied these days and the Supreme Court has
shown little evidence that it has applied sufficient understanding of
how legal fictions should operate in the construction and application of
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Chevron fictions.  Legal fictions, the “white lies” of the legal world,273
have had a long and controversial existence, going back at least to
Ancient Rome.274  While Blackstone defended them in the 1760s, Ben-
tham excoriated them in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies.275  Bentham is the most famous and likely the most vehement
critic of legal fiction.276  However, he was far from first and has hardly
been alone in his condemnation.  In 1656, in the Examen Legum An-
gliae, or The Laws of England Examined by Scripture, Antiquity, and
Reason, an unnamed author averred “that all manner of pleadings
and proceedings, both in law and equity, are stuffed with falsehood
and lies.”277
Perhaps as often as they have been attacked, legal fictions have
also long been defended, not only for their utility but also for their
intellectual delight.  In 1841, one author rhapsodized, “To us . . . it is
always a matter of extreme delight and refreshment to turn to those
exquisite fictions which both adorn and simplify our law—mingling
utility with sweetness, and tending to the noblest end to which poetry
can devote itself—namely, to benefit mankind and render them
happy.”278
Legal fictions were a hot topic among legal scholars, especially in
the nineteenth century, and then again in the 1920s and ’30s.279  They
were actively discussed by such eminent legal scholars as Maine be-
ginning in the 1860s, John Gray in 1909, and Roscoe Pound in the
1920s; C. K. Ogden and Lon. L. Fuller argued about Bentham, Vaih-
273. LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 5 (1967) (quoting VON IHERING, GEIST DES ROMI-
SCHEN RECHTS AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN STUFEN SEINER ENTWICKLUNG 305 (6th
ed. 1924)).
274. Edwin W. Patterson, Historical and Evolutionary Theories of Law, 51 COLUM. L.
REV. 681, 690 (1951).
275. Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substi-
tuted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1990) (“Bentham was at one end of the spec-
trum in regard to the legal fiction.  Not surprisingly, Sir William Blackstone was
at the other.  Blackstone came to the defense of the legal fiction in several
passages of the Commentaries.”)  For Blackstone’s discussion of legal fiction, see
Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 38 n.205
(1996).
276. Bentham’s sharp and unrelenting criticism of legal fictions are scattered in many
of his writings.  For a history and excellent discussion of his vivid criticism of
legal fiction and its relationship with his views of fiction in general, see Nomi
Maya Stolzenberg, Bentham’s Theory of Legal Fictions—A “Curious Double Lan-
guage,” 11 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 223, 226–28 (1999).
277. Quoted in Oliver R. Mitchell, The Fictions of the Law: Have They Proved Useful or
Detrimental to Its Growth?, 7 HARV. L. REV. 249, 250 (1893).
278. Legal Fictions, 9 MONTHLY L. MAG. 172, 173 (1841).
279. Harmon, supra note 275, at 1, 11 (“The legal fiction did not remain a hot topic on
the jurisprudential agenda throughout the nineteenth century.  For some reason,
interest cooled down until the 1920’s when Roscoe Pound, John Chipman Gray,
and Lon Fuller rekindled the dormant fires that Bentham had once so vigorously
poked and prodded.”).
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inger, and legal fictions in the 1930s.280  Fuller’s noted series of arti-
cles on legal fictions, published in the 1930s, constituted the
culmination of that era’s fascination with the topic and is still consid-
ered the foremost authority on legal fictions.281  Perhaps because
Fuller’s treatment of legal fictions seemed so complete and magiste-
rial, scholarly interest in legal fictions dropped like a stone, as “inter-
est in [legal fictions] withered and died, and virtually fell off the
vine.”282
Though there were sporadic explorations of the topic of legal fic-
tions after Fuller’s great work, the subject lay mostly fallow until
fairly recently.  For decades, writing about legal fictions seemed al-
most to require explaining or even apologizing for their continued ex-
istence because they are not currently held in high esteem, and one
legal scholar stated that “the accusation of using a ‘legal fiction’ may
have overtaken ‘formalist’ as the most ubiquitous and ill-defined of
jurisprudential condemnations.”283  While the Supreme Court has in-
creased its references to “legal fiction” starting in the 1970s, that in-
crease appears to be most prevalent in concurring and dissenting
opinions, indicating that the term is used to “indicate increased am-
bivalence about the defensibility of legal justification in general and
certain justifications in particular.”284  In other words, the Supreme
Court may employ legal fictions, but when it directly refers to legal
fictions, one might assume that use typically is or implies criticism.285
In 1986, Soifer noted, “There is a widespread, albeit somewhat
vague idea that Lon Fuller wrote quite intelligently about legal fic-
tions a long time ago, but few in America seriously grapple with the
280. Maine discussed legal fiction in Ancient Law, as did Gray in The Nature and
Sources of Law; Pound did as well in Interpretations of Legal History. See SIR
HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1906); JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE
AND SOURCES OF LAW 30–38 (1909); ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL
HISTORY 130–34 (1923).  C.K. Ogden revived interest in Bentham’s treatment of
fiction in Bentham’s Theory of Fictions. See C. K. OGDEN, BENTHAM’S THEORY OF
FICTIONS (1932).  Lon L. Fuller criticized Bentham’s attacks on legal fictions in
his important series of articles on legal fictions published in the 1930s and col-
lected in FULLER, supra note 273.
281. L. L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363 (1930) (Part I in a three-part
series); L. L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 513 (1931) (Part II); L. L.
Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 877 (1931) (Part III).  These three articles
were collected in “only slightly altered form” according to the author and with a
new introduction in FULLER, supra note 273.
282. Harmon, supra note 275, at 1.
283. Frederick Schauer, Legal Fictions Revisited, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 113 (Maksymilian Del Mar & William Twining eds., 2015).
284. Karen Petroski, Legal Fictions and the Limits of Legal Language, in LEGAL FIC-
TIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 283, at 144–45.
285. Id.
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use and abuse of legal fictions.”286  As if having to defend his interest
in them, Soifer added that “a powerful claim can be made that legal
fictions attract little attention today precisely because they so domi-
nate American law.  Post-realist lawyers, scholars, and judges concede
that legal fictions are the tools of our legal trade.”287  In 1990, Harmon
asked, almost plaintively, about legal fictions, “Why would anyone
want to write, or read for that matter, an article about a formerly hot
topic?  For historical insight perhaps.”288
Since 1980, however, we have seen a dramatic increase in interest
about and reinvigoration of the topic of legal fiction.289  Legal fictions
have been extensively discussed in articles on the legal determination
of death,290 taxes,291 grand jury independence,292 Native American
legal history,293 law as specialized language,294 slavery,295 copyright
law,296 diplomatic protection,297 immigration law,298 corporations,299
286. Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871, 872 (1986) (citations
omitted).
287. Id. at 876.
288. Harmon, supra note 275, at 1.
289. See, e.g., R.A. Samek, Fictions and the Law, 31 U. TORONTO L.J. 290 (1981); Ken-
neth Campbell, Fuller on Legal Fictions, 2 LAW & PHIL. 339 (1983); Soifer, supra
note 286, at 871; Bruce Ziff, The Rule Against Multiple Fictions, 25 ALTA. L. REV.
160 (1987); J.H. BAKER, Legal Fictions, in THE LAW’S TWO BODIES 33 (2001).
290. R. Alta Charo, Dusk, Dawn, and Defining Death: Legal Classifications and Bio-
logical Categories, in THE DEFINITION OF DEATH 277 (Stuart J. Youngner, Robert
M. Arnold & Renie Schapiro eds., 1999); Seema K Shah, Robert D Truog &
Franklin G Miller, Death and Legal Fictions, 37 J. MED. ETHICS 719, 719 (2011);
Seema K. Shah, Piercing the Veil: The Limits of Brain Death as a Legal Fiction,
48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 301, 322 (2015); Seema K. Shah & Franklin G. Miller,
Can We Handle the Truth? Legal Fictions in the Determination of Death, 36 AM.
J.L. & MED. 540, 561 (2010); Robert D. Truog, Defining Death: Getting it Wrong
for All the Right Reasons, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1885, 1910 (2015).
291. John A. Miller, Liars Should Have Good Memories: Legal Fictions and the Tax
Code, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1993); see also Dana R. Irwin, Removing the Scaf-
folding: The QTIP Provisions and the Ownership Fiction, 84 NEB. L. REV. 571,
586 (2005) (discussing the ownership fiction); Walter C. Cliff & Benjamin J. Co-
hen, Collateral Fictions and Section 482, 36 TAX LAW. 37, 37 (1982) (examining
“the extent to which legal fiction should govern the tax consequences of transac-
tions” and the criteria to establish collateral fictions).
292. Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 33–55, (2004).
293. Hope M. Babcock, The Stories We Tell, and Have Told, About Tribal Sovereignty:
Legal Fictions at Their Most Pernicious, 55 VILL. L. REV. 803 (2010); Jen Camden
& Kathryn E. Fort, “Channeling Thought”: The Legacy of Legal Fictions from
1823, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 77 (2009).
294. Frederick Schauer, Is Law a Technical Language?, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 501
(2015).
295. CHRISTINA ACCOMANDO, “THE REGULATIONS OF ROBBERS” (2001).
296. Alina Ng Boyte, The Conceits of Our Legal Imagination: Legal Fictions and the
Concept of Deemed Authorship, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 707 (2014).
297. Annemarieke Vermeer-Künzli, As If: The Legal Fiction in Diplomatic Protection,
18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 37 (2007).
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and capital punishment for those with an intellectual disability.300  In
addition, legal fiction itself has recently been the primary subject of
significant scholarly work, covering legal fictions both historical301
and modern.302  In 2015, as if to demonstrate the renewed interest in
legal fictions, an entire book of articles by a wide variety of interna-
tional scholars was published, all focusing on different aspects of legal
fictions.303
The intellectual history of legal fictions can be told by how scholars
answer the following  primary questions: (1) What is the definition
and nature of a legal fiction? (2) When and in what forms are legal
fictions generally useful or dangerous and how and why? (3) Why do
they persist in the modern era and should they?
A crucial area of dispute regarding the definition of legal fictions is
whether the fact created or asserted must necessarily be false or, al-
ternatively, might be true or at least possible.  Fictions should be dis-
tinguished between those which assert no falsehood, such as the
Roman fictio, which merely asserted in essence, “Treat X as if it were
Y,” and those that permit blatant, undisclosed falsehoods, such as En-
glish common law procedural fictions that allowed litigants to plead
false facts that were treated as conclusively true.  One must distin-
guish between open and honest fictions, the fictive nature of which is
clear in their use, and concealed and dishonest fictions that hide the
true facts and so evade review.
Any study of legal fictions should note which such fictions merely
cure deficiencies in procedure, jurisdiction, or remedies, and which fic-
tions make or change substantive law.304  A procedural fiction is one
298. Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of the Legal
Fiction in Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 51 (1989).
299. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A
Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767,
781–82 (2005).
300. Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital Punishment and
the Mentally Retarded Defendant After Penry v. Johnson, 35 AKRON L. REV. 327
(2002).
301. Ian MacLean, Legal Fictions and Fictional Entities in Renaissance Jurispru-
dence, 20 J. LEGAL. HIST. 1 (1999); Eben Moglen, Legal Fictions and Common
Law Legal Theory: Some Historical Reflections, 10 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 33
(1990).
302. Nancy Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1
(2010); Peter Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435 (2007).
303. Schauer, supra note 283.  This volume incorporated a collection of four articles
previously published in the 2013 edition of the International Journal of Law in
Context, a translation of a Hans Kelsen article from 1919, as well as an addi-
tional thirteen articles.
304. Jeremiah Smith, Surviving Fictions, 27 YALE L.J. 147, 154 (1917) (“In the past
there have been two principal reasons for employment of fictions in law.  First.
To cure deficiencies in the law of procedure.  Second.  To conceal the fact that
judges, by their decisions, are making or changing the substantive law.”).
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that treats a false or unproven allegation as fact for a procedural pur-
pose, such as using a conclusive presumption to establish a fact neces-
sary for a claim.305  A remedial fiction is one used not to prove the
underlying claim but rather to allow courts access to remedies that
might be unavailable but for the fiction.  Many equitable remedies,
such as constructive trusts, constructive liens, quasi-contract, devel-
oped through legal fiction.306  Jurisdictional fictions are those that al-
low a court to expand its jurisdiction while purporting to respect its
jurisdictional limits.  Other times, they are used to establish which
courts could have jurisdiction for interests that have no exact physical
location.  Substantive fictions, which became more common in the
nineteenth century, “move beyond fictions as mere pleading mecha-
nisms . . . to recognize substantive doctrines based on fictions,” such as
implied contracts and the constructive delivery of gifts.307  Obviously,
there is much overlap between these aspects, as procedural fictions
often serve to expand the limits of jurisdiction or remedial powers.308
There have likely been legal fictions as long as there have been
lawyers.  Legal fictions were common in Roman law, and the fictions
employed there served as an inspiration and justification for their
subsequent use in English common law and European law.  Roman
law required extensive use of legal fiction to function because Roman
statutory law was very difficult to change and so required numerous
work-arounds to amend law as societal and legal needs changed.  Ro-
man customary law had been codified in the Twelve Tablets in 451
B.C.E., at the insistence of plebeians who wanted the protection of
written law.309  Significant legislative change proved difficult.  From
the fifth to first centuries B.C.E., statutes could be passed by Roman
assemblies, but those had to be called by magistrates.  Such statutes
additionally required approval by the Senate.  As noted by Phillipson,
“Given this structure, it is not surprising that the assemblies did not
serve as the chief innovators during most of the Republic.”310  Civil
Roman law was therefore characterized by rigid forms and narrow
outlines, and legal fictions were used to adapt the rigid formulas to
changing circumstances.  “The concept of fictio iuris was understood
305. See FULLER, supra note 273, at 40–42 for a discussion of conclusive presumptions
as fictions.
306. Chaim Saiman, Restitution and the Production of Legal Doctrine, 65 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 993, 1029 (2008).
307. Note, Lessons from Abroad: Mathematical, Poetic, and Literary Fictions in the
Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2228, 2233 (2002).
308. Harmon, supra note 275, at 2 (“A procedural legal fiction . . . was usually em-
ployed to enlarge jurisdiction.  Procedural legal fictions could also be used to ex-
tend substantive remedies.”).
309. Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Federalist and the Lessons of Rome, 75 MISS. L.J. 431
(2006).
310. See Donald E. Phillipson, Development of the Roman Law of Debt Security, 20
STAN. L. REV. 1230, 1231 (1968).
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as a powerful instrument for the transformation and adaptation of the
Ius Civile to new situations . . . .”311
Roman legal fictions were often created by a praetor, who acted as
an administrator in the Roman judicial process.  Roman legal actions
had two stages, with the first being a hearing in front of a praetor to
determine whether some aspect of Roman civil law was at issue and
how such issue should be settled.  Then, a trial was conducted by an
iudex, a qualified layperson, with directions from the praetor.312
Praetors found themselves faced with claimants who, though they
seemed to have worthy claims, could not sue within the narrow con-
fines of Roman statutory law, and so praetors created legal fictions
stipulating that, contrary to the actual facts, the claimants satisfied
the requirements of Roman law.  Creating these legal fictions allowed
praetors and the fictions they created “to aid, supplement, or correct
ius civile.”313
Roman law, while filled with legal fictions, was at least fairly
transparent in its use, in that the Roman fictions were obvious from
the grammar employed.  Roman legal fictions typically did not require
misstatements of fact, but rather allowed for judgments that were
based on “assumptions contrary to fact” with the assumptions clearly
marked as such.314  Roman law had originally been created for use by
and between Romans, creating unfairness and difficulty in disputes
involving noncitizens.315  Aliens could be treated as if they were citi-
zens without anyone stating explicitly that they were so, however,
with the fiction that they were to be treated as if they were citizens.316
Birks notes the use of legal fiction allowed Roman law to change with
the times, while still purporting merely to interpret the Twelve
Tables.
Roman law was highly influential in the creation of civil law in
Europe during the Middle Ages.  A generation of legal scholars in the
twelfth century, the Glossators, made great efforts to reconstruct Jus-
tinian’s Code and to complete a full gloss of it, attempting to resolve
its apparent contradictions.  The Glossators attempted to clarify the
use of the Roman fictio and how their use compared to mere presump-
311. Raymundo Gama, Presumptions and Fictions: A Collingwoodian Approach, in LE-
GAL FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 283.
312. Peter Stein, Interpretation and Legal Reasoning in Roman Law, 70 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1539, 1540 (1995).
313. Clifford Ando, Fact, Fiction, and Social Reality in Roman Law, in LEGAL FICTIONS
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 283, at 315.
314. Raphael Demos, Legal Fictions, 34 INT. J. ETHICS, no. 1, 1923, at 37, 39.
315. Simeon Baldwin, A Legal Fiction with Its Wings Clipped, 41 AM. L. REV. 38, 38
(1907).
316. Peter Birks, Fictions Ancient and Modern, in THE LEGAL MIND: ESSAYS FOR TONY
HONORÉ 86 (Neil MacCormick & Peter Birks eds., 1986).
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tions.317  The next great generation of Medieval jurists, the Commen-
tators, sought to apply and adapt Roman law to their current
situation, and so fill out their law.318  One of the greatest of these was
Bartolus de Sasoferrato, who helped create the modern conception of a
corporation from the legal fiction that there was an entity distinct
from the people who had created the entity, an idea he applied to the
university.  Bartolus argued that, while some claimed that the whole
of the university differs not from the sum of its parts, “according to
legal fiction they err.  For a university represents a person, which is
different than the scholars, or its members.”319  Legal fictions, there-
fore, are at the heart of the modern conception of the corporation.
As English common law developed, jurists often found the need to
resort to legal fictions for the same reason Roman praetors had: to
allow legal change while at the same time purporting to respect the
unbending rules of old.320  Judges used legal fiction to expand and
adapt the use of hidebound procedures and also to change English
substantive law.  While the Roman praetors used legal fictions to cir-
cumvent the code contained in the Twelve Tablets, English judges
used legal fictions to circumvent the precept that they did not make
law, but rather merely discovered preexisting law that had long ex-
isted in custom or in nature.321
While modern law students may think of the English common law
as judge-made law, the conception at the time of Blackstone was quite
different.  The common law was supposedly not the product of judicial
decision, but rather the legal embodiment of English custom from
time immemorial.  Unlike statutory law, which gains its authority
from that of its enactors, common law was thought to exist as an an-
cient and virtually unchangeable set of rules and “their original insti-
tution and authority are not set down in writing, as acts of parliament
are, but they receive their binding power, and the force of laws, by
long and immemorial usage . . . .”322  In his influential Commentaries,
Blackstone asserted, “[J]udges do not pretend to make a new law, but
317. Gama, supra note 311, at 350.
318. Id.
319. BARTOLUS OF SASSOFERATO, Commentary on Dig. 48.19.16.10 (1653), quoted in
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A
Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767,
781 (2005).
320. Knauer, supra note 302, at 13 (“According to Blackstone, judges and lawyers
were ‘obliged’ to resort to fictions because otherwise the law was static.”).
321. Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 765, 774
(2004) (“Law was understood to preexist the act of judicial decision, and that was
so even when the law was unwritten.  To a considerable extent the law was un-
derstood to exist in custom, while others thought the law was also to be found in
human and legal reason.”).
322. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *64.
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to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation.”323  Maitland called
this notion “[t]he legal fiction of the perfection of the English Common
Law, the supposition that there is somewhere a code of perfect law, by
means of which an English judge may supplement the stat-
utes . . . .”324  Blackstone even asserted the superiority of the unwrit-
ten common law over acts of Parliament, as if to further freeze the
development of English law.325
Of course, this ancient, unchangeable common law presented
problems for the English jurist similar to those faced by the praetor
caused by the virtually unchangeable ancient Roman statutes.  In
both systems, legal fictions provided workarounds for fixed but no
longer functional law.
The legal fictions of English law were far less transparent than
Roman legal fictions in ways that caused too-little-remarked damage.
Baker noted that, while legal fictions were useful to develop law, they
did so in a surreptitious way, as legal fiction “works off the record,
without overt legal reasoning, and therefore suppresses principle.”326
While a Roman fiction may require a praetor to treat a litigant as if he
were a Roman citizen, though he is not, no actual misstatement of fact
need be made and the fiction is obvious in the grammar of the form of
action.  English legal fiction, however, abounded in misstatement of
fact, however, as it “appeared as a statement of fact; its fictitious char-
acter . . . [was] apparent only to the initiate.”327  Birks explained the
difference between the Roman and English forms of legal fiction by
stating, “[F]ictions behind a form of action are concealed falsehood. . . .
On the other hand fictions in the form of action are neither concealed
nor dishonest. . . .  English pleading fictions are of the former kind,
Roman of the latter.”328
How unbelievable legal fictions could be in England and still be
used can be seen in the famous legal fiction employed by the eminent
Lord Mansfield when faced with a lawsuit brought by a British citizen
against the governor of the Mediterranean island of Minorca, then
under British Rule.329  Fabrigas, the plaintiff and a resident of Mi-
323. Id. at *69.
324. Frederic William Maitland, 1 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDRIC WILLIAM
MAITLAND 4 (H.L.A. Fisher ed., 1911), http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/871/
0242-01_Bk.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/C5GT-ZJG2].
325. “[A]ll the perplexed questions . . . (which have sometimes disgraced the English,
as well as other courts of justice) owe their original not to the common law itself,
but to innovations that have been made in it by acts of parliament[.]”  Blackstone,
supra note 322, at 10, quoted in Mark Carter, ‘Blackstoned’ Again: Common Law
Liberties, the Canadian Constitution, and the Principles of Fundamental Justice,
13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 343, 349–50 (2007).
326. Baker, supra note 289, at 55.
327. FULLER, supra note 273, at 36
328. Birks, supra note 316, at 86.
329. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B.).
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norca, was imprisoned by Mostyn, the governor of Minorca and then
exiled from the island.  Fabrigas sued in a London court of common
pleas and received a jury award in the astounding amount of 3000
pounds.  Fabrigas had sued in England because suing in Minorca re-
quired the governor’s permission, a permission unlikely to be extended
as the governor himself was the defendant.330  Mostyn appealed,
based on the valid argument that the trial court’s jurisdiction ex-
tended only to cases brought by London residents.331
To obtain jurisdiction by the King’s Court, Fabrigas had alleged
that Mostyn attacked him “at Minorca, (to wit) at London aforesaid, in
the parish of St. Mary le Bow, in the ward of Cheap . . . .”332  Fabrigas
needed both the truth and the fiction about where he had been at-
tacked and imprisoned, because had he claimed only an assault and
imprisonment in London, Mostyn could easily have disproved the
claims, while if he alleged only Minorcan assault and imprisonment,
there would be no jurisdiction.
Lord Mansfield upheld the use of this absurd fiction to provide ju-
risdiction, noting that otherwise the plaintiff would have no access to
justice, and further explained how the plaintiff could rely on contra-
dictory truth and legal fiction: “[W]hen it is absolutely necessary to lay
the truth of the case in the declaration, there is a fiction of law to
assist you, and you shall not make use of the truth of the case against
that fiction, but you may make use of it to every other purpose.”333
English legal fictions, by their lack of transparency, allowed a dan-
gerous evasion of appellate review, given that such appellate review
was at the time typically restricted to the official legal record, which
normally omitted and therefore concealed the legal fictions employed.
Professor Daniel Klerman has theorized that this evasion of review
was actually the purpose of many early English legal fictions, as lower
courts eager to expand their jurisdiction used legal fictions to assert
jurisdiction over the case or the person.334  Because pre-Modern En-
glish courts depended on fee income, their jurists were motivated to
expand their jurisdiction in order to obtain more cases and, accord-
ingly, income.  Legal fictions were thus deployed to claim that an
event had occurred within the jurisdictional boundaries of the court,
330. Mansfield noted the unfairness of the governor’s power, stating, “[T]o lay down in
an English Court of Justice such a monstrous proposition, as that a governor
acting by virtue of letters patent under the Great Seal, is accountable only to
God, and his own conscience; that he is absolutely despotic, and can spoil, plun-
der, and affect His Majesty’s subjects, both in their liberty and property, with
impunity, is a doctrine that cannot be maintained.” Id. at 1029.
331. Schauer, supra note 283, at 122.
332. Mostyn, 96 Eng. Rep. at 1022.
333. Id. at 1032.
334. Daniel Klerman, Legal Fictions and Appellate Review 2 (May 16, 2016) (unpub-
lished manuscript).
2017] DEFERENCE AND FICTION 761
or that the defendant had been arrested and bailed within such juris-
diction, thus giving the court jurisdiction.335  This effort to increase
their jurisdiction and hence their fees while evading appellate review
explains the explosion of legal fiction in pre-Modern England,
Klerman argues, and also explains why so many legal fictions benefit
plaintiffs, who could typically choose their jurisdiction.336
B. The Evolving Definition of “Legal Fiction”
Since the Middle Ages, scholars have struggled to define “legal fic-
tion,” with some emphasizing its form and relation to truth or false-
hood and others emphasizing its function.  Harmon notes, “What is a
legal fiction?  None of the participants in the historical debate could
agree.  The problem was one of scope: what should be included in the
definition.”337  A great difficulty in defining legal fictions comes from
their ubiquity, how many different areas of law they permeate, and
what different forms they take in those different areas.
While the Romans made extensive use of legal fictions, we have
little record of Roman theoretical discussion of them.  Our knowledge
of the full extent of the use of legal fiction in Roman is limited by how
little treatment of legal fiction in Roman civil procedure survives from
antiquity.338  Ando notes that Gaius, after discussing a specific legal
fiction, made “clearly unsystematic remarks” about “fictions of an-
other kind,” but “provide[d] at best an ostensive definition.” 339  Oli-
vier argued, “It may therefore be deduced that Gaius understood by
the legal fiction the incontestable, consciously false assumption of cer-
tain facts as the basis for a new action or rule of law.  The same mean-
ing can be deduced from a number of Digest texts.” 340
In their effort to explicate Roman law, Medieval jurists turned to
the task of defining “legal fiction.”  Cinus of Pistoia (1270–1336) dis-
tinguished fiction from presumption by stating “fictio est in re certa
contraria veritati pro veritate assumptio,” labeling a fiction as the as-
sumption to be true that which is known to be false.341  Bartolus fur-
ther noted that legal fictions are those assumptions made by law for
specific legal consequence.342  His disciple, Baldus, defined legal fic-
tion as follows: “[F]iction is an assumption contrary to truth in a mat-
335. Id.
336. Id. at 9.
337. Harmon, supra note 275, at 2.
338. Ando, supra note 313, at 296 (noting that “only one extended treatment of fictions
as foundational to Roman civil procedure is known to have been written in classi-
cal antiquity, namely, that occurring in the fourth book of Gaius’s Institutes,” and
even that is missing a crucial page introducing the topic of fictions).
339. Id. at 297.
340. PIERRE J.J. OLIVIER, LEGAL FICTIONS IN PRACTICE AND LEGAL SCIENCE 9 (1975).
341. Gama, supra note 311, at 352.
342. Id. (attributing this to Bartolus and Baldo, Bartolus’s disciple).
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ter known with certainty; and it is to be noted that wherever
something can be said properly to be asserted, or properly to exist,
there is truth; and wherever something cannot be said properly to be
asserted, or properly to exist, there is fiction.”343  With this definition,
Baldus rooted legal fiction in the necessity of falsehood, or at least
lack of known truth.  This represented a turning away from the actual
use of fictions in Roman law, which displayed their fictional nature in
the language used and is perhaps unsurprising, because the setting of
the Roman fictions, directions from the praetor to a iudex, were no
longer extant, and so little discussion by the Romans on the theory
and understanding of their use of legal fictions had survived.
Jeremy Bentham, the staunchest critic of legal fictions, provided a
functional definition of legal fiction as a “wilful falsehood, having for
its object the stealing of legislative power, by and for hands, which
could not, or durst not, openly claim it—and, but for the delusion thus
produced, could not exercise it.”344  Elsewhere, he provided a less sav-
age definition focused on form, stating that for fiction “in the sense in
which it is used by lawyers, understand a false assertion of the privi-
leged kind, and which, though acknowledged to be false, is at the same
time argued from, and acted upon, as if true.”345
Maine famously defined legal fictions by what he believed was
their function rather than by their form.  He stated, “I . . . employ the
expression ‘Legal Fiction’ to signify any assumption which conceals, or
affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration,
its letter remaining unchanged, its operation being modified.”346  As
will be discussed further, Maine thought that legal fictions were more
useful in primitive legal systems, though their necessity would decline
with the historical development of the law, and his definition of legal
fiction fit what he considered should be their appropriately declining
use. 347
In his classic treatise on legal fiction, Lon Fuller devoted an entire
chapter to the topic, “What Is a Legal Fiction?”  He noted that one
must distinguish between a legal fiction and a lie by that fact that a lie
is typically intended to deceive, while a legal fiction is not, though the
fiction “may, perhaps, be held accountable as accomplice in a process
of deception, but not as principal.”348  Fuller, in what is considered the
343. MacLean, supra note 301, at 1, 4.
344. JEREMY BENTHAM, Preface Intended for the Second Edition of THE FRAGMENT OF
GOVERNMENT, in A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT OF GOV-
ERNMENT 509 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977).
345. JEREMY BENTHAM, CONSTITUTIONAL CODE XII, quoted in OGDEN, supra note 280,
at cxvi.
346. MAINE, supra note 280, at 21–22.
347. Gerard N. Magliocca, The Constitution Can Do No Wrong, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV.
723, 728.
348. FULLER, supra note 273, at 7.
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“now classic”349 definition, defined a legal fiction as either “(1) a state-
ment propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its fal-
sity, or (2) a false statement recognized as having utility.”350  Fuller
recognized that his definition contains “two entirely discordant ele-
ments,” both requiring falsity, but one focused on the user’s conscious-
ness of falsity, the other one the usefulness of that falsity.351  And he
cabins in his definition his beliefs about when fictions should be used:
when they are useful, and when those involved understand their fal-
sity and hence the fictive nature of their use.352
While Fuller’s definition is oft-cited, it does not seem to recognize
the practical use of legal fictions even where the party employing
them knows that the matter asserted is or could well be true.  A party
may rely on an evidentiary legal fiction for something that the party
knows is in fact true or probably true, where doing so would be easier
and more certain than attempting to prove the purported fact.353  For
the same reason, a court would normally allow the use of many evi-
dentiary fictions such as conclusive presumptions to speed a trial,
even if the court knew or suspected that the assertion so presumed
was in fact true.354  The fact that a litigant may deploy a legal fiction
or a court accept a fiction to establish legal authority for something
that they know is or may well be true does not negate the existence or
alter the fictional nature of the legal fiction.
A more modern view of legal fictions, therefore, should treat fiction
as an “as if” proposition that does not depend on whether the assump-
tion is literally true or false.355  Instead, legal fictions merely treat a
matter as true regardless of its truth or falsity.  Ian MacLean avoids
the issue of the actual or likely falsity of the presented proposition by
defining legal fiction in the starkest formulistic terms.  “Legal fiction
is an operation which could summarily be expressed as follows: ‘ex-
349. Knauer, supra note 302, at 5.
350. FULLER, supra note 273, at 9.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 10 (“A fiction becomes wholly safe only when it is used with a complete
consciousness of its falsity.”).
353. Campbell, supra note 289, at 343 (“There will be no need to call witnesses, pro-
duce documents, and so on.”).
354. Id.
355. For a more robust discussion on “as if” propositions and their far-reaching impor-
tance in many areas of science, law, and other human intellectual endeavors, see
H. VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF “AS IF” (C.K. Ogden trans., 1924).  Altman
argued that Vaihinger saw the dangers as well as utility in “As If” thinking:
“Vaihinger notes that many disciplines, including law, rely on fictions—or acting
‘as if’ something known to be false were true.  He saw that it is a nearly universal
human tendency, in order to acquire the benefit of those fictions with a minimum
of psychological stress, actually to come to believe them.  This process Vaihinger
called an ideational shift from fiction to dogma.”  Scott Altman, Beyond Candor,
89 MICH. L. REV. 296, 301 n.13 (1990).
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tend to B a rule of law which applies to A by saying “B shall be deemed
to be A.’”356  This definition falls short, however, in that many legal
fictions do not result in applying the same rule of law to B as to A.  A
constructive trust created by the court’s equitable powers, for exam-
ple, is treated so differently from an actual trust, that the rules gov-
erning it are addressed in the Restatement of Restitution rather than
the Restatement of Trusts.357  The usefulness of the constructive trust
lies not in its direct extension of rules of trusts to constructive trusts
but rather its analogizing constructive trusts to express trusts.358
Lind, by comparison, takes issue with the idea that legal fiction
necessarily concerns an untruth, calling this the “falsehood tradi-
tion.”359  He argues, instead, that legal fictions are primarily state-
ments that are true inside of the “linguistic journal systems within
they originate and are used” but “would be a false proposition if as-
serted under different techniques of usage in a belief system or realm
of reality other than law (e.g. everyday reality) . . . .”360  As an exam-
ple, Lind takes the legal fiction “the corporation is a person.”  Lind
asserts that this is a correct statement within the law because “the
term ‘person’ includes corporations within its extension.”361  Lind
calls this interplay between the use of legal fictions in their “corrective
background” and the extralegal meaning the same words would con-
note in a nonlegal system the “intersystemic conflict thesis” of legal
fictions.362
Lind argues that legal fictions function effectively if applied within
their legal context, so long as they “work satisfactorily as proposi-
tional claims of legal truth without harming or upsetting any accepted
meanings or truths with which they collide.”363  However, even Lind’s
definition of legal fiction overstates the importance of falseness to a
legal fiction, in that it requires that the fiction be false if stated in
some nonlegal usage, and so does not adequately describe the legal
fictions that happen to be true or those that fix some legal truth that
356. MacLean, supra note 301, at 1.
357. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“Except as a
constructive trust establishes an express trust or arises out of an express trust or
an attempt to create an express trust, the rules applicable to constructive trusts
are not dealt with in this Restatement.  These rules are more broadly dealt with
in the Restatement of Restitution.”).
358. Emily Sherwin, Unjust Enrichment and Creditors, 27 REV. LITIG. 141 (2007)
(“Constructive trusts originated in equity courts, based on an analogy to express
trusts in which one party holds title to property for the benefit of another.”).
359. Douglas Lind, The Pragmatic Value of Legal Fictions, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 283, at 101.
360. Id. at 93.
361. Id. at 94.
362. Lind, supra note 359, at 99.
363. Id. at 94.
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is neither true nor false outside the confines of the law, as will be
discussed.
The connection between legal fiction and falsity seems most tenu-
ous when such fictions are applied to situations where the actual facts
are in some way unknowable or are, to the extent they exist, the prod-
uct of the legal fiction rather than the disproof of the legal fiction.  For
example, some consider brain death, the “irreversible cessation of all
functions of the entire brain,” to be a legal fiction, because it does not
directly and necessarily correspond to complete death, when the heart
stops beating and the body grows cold.364  However, the concept of
brain death is a legal construct, one that permits the legal harvesting
of organs, rather than a biological concept, and so “brain death” if le-
gally true cannot be said to be actually false.
The requirement of falsity also creates an inherent contradiction
for legal fictions, in that to be successfully employed, according to
Fuller, legal fictions should be used with full knowledge of their fal-
sity, but when they are used on a wide-spread basis with all under-
standing their falsity, their use no longer feels like the assertion of a
counterfactual claim but rather the application of well-known legal
doctrine.  For example, constructive notice had long been thought a
legal fiction, useful in cases where one even without actual notice
should be deemed to have notice.365  However, the widespread use and
acceptance of this fiction has rendered it, in some eyes, non-fictional, a
mere legal premise.  As noted by Karen Petroski, for basic construc-
tive knowledge doctrine,
[N]otions that were once considered fictions have been so thoroughly absorbed
into legal practice and discourse that they have become just another way of
establishing the premises for a legal conclusion.  Since this type of legal pre-
mise does not depend on the presentation of evidence in the traditional sense,
it does not displace or conflict with the establishment of factual premises for a
legal conclusion.366
This reclassification of constructive notice, however, ignores that
legal fictions have, since Roman times, been used as a “means of es-
tablishing the premises for a legal conclusion” without presenting the
evidence otherwise necessary for that legal conclusion.  The Roman
fictio of treating noncitizens as if they were citizens, for example,
made proof of their citizenship irrelevant and in no way displaces or
contradicts other factual elements involved in the dispute.  And Nancy
J. Knauer, another modern scholar of legal fictions, readily asserts
that constructive trusts are a legal fiction, even though they too have
364. Shah, supra note 290, at 302.
365. Karen Petroski, Fictions of Omniscience, 103 KY. L.J. 477, 514 (2014–15) (“At one
time, commentators had no hesitation in describing constructive notice doctrines
as ‘fictions.’”) (quoting VEPA P. SARATHI, V.K. VARADACHARI’S LEGAL FICTIONS 30,
33, 83 (2d ed. 2012)).
366. Id. at 514.
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been thoroughly absorbed into modern law, both statutory and judge-
made.367
Even Fuller, who is universally cited as linking legal fiction inex-
tricably to falsity, demonstrates that legal fiction should not require
the assertion of a falsehood.  In his discussion of conclusive presump-
tions, which he labels fictions, Fuller admits that the presumed fact
might well be true.  “Conceivably, the presumed fact may be present
in reality in a case where the party to chooses to rely on the conclusive
presumption, either because proof would be difficult or because he
does not know whether the fact is present or not.”368  Falsity of the
presumed fact therefore is not necessary for the legal fiction.  Fuller
attempts to avoid this problem by arguing, “But the conclusive pre-
sumption says, ‘The presence of Fact X is conclusive proof of Fact A.’
This statement is false, since we know that Fact X does not ‘conclu-
sively prove’ Fact A.”369
Fuller’s argument fails, however, for two reasons.  First, in some
individual cases, Fact X could conclusively prove Fact A, and so in
those cases the presumption as expressed by Fuller would no longer be
false.  Second, the conclusive presumption could be reformulated as “If
Fact X, then whether Fact A is true or false is inconsequential and the
legal result of Fact A will be applied in this case as if Fact A were
true.”  This statement would be true and is a more accurate reflection
of the result of the conclusive presumption.
That Fuller should not have required falsity for legal fictions is
also demonstrated by a central point of his work on legal fiction.  The
application of fiction in reasoning is, to Fuller, the use of a “foreign
element” as an instrument of thought that is useful to understand and
possibly simplify the reasoning process.  Fuller leaned heavily in his
analysis of legal fiction on the general work on fictions of Hans Vaih-
inger, the great German theorist of fictions, who compared the use of
fiction in thought generally to a mathematician simplifying the solu-
tion of an equation by inserting into it some new element, being care-
ful to remove it before reaching the final result.  Fuller notes as
Vaihinger’s precept for applying fictions, “The fiction must drop out of
the final reckoning.”370  Fuller gives as an example the legal fiction of
a corporation as a person, which is useful so long as “we correct the
error by extracting from the word ‘person’ (when it is applied to corpo-
rations) all those qualities and attributes not legally appropriate to
the corporation.”371  Fuller even criticizes Vaihinger for asserting that
this correction need not be done for legal fictions, noting that doing so
367. Knauer, supra note 302, at 12–13.
368. FULLER, supra note 273, at 41.
369. Id. at 41–42.
370. FULLER, supra note 273, at 117 (emphasis in original).
371. Id. at 118.
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“can only be attributed to [Vaihinger’s] lack of an intimate acquain-
tance with the legal fiction.”372
If the fiction should be extracted from legal reasoning, however, it
seems unnecessary that the faction include a falsity.  Just as the
mathematician need not care whether the number she inserts into an
equation is positive, negative, or imaginary so long as the number is
extracted eventually, it should also not matter whether the legal fic-
tion contains a falsity because, true or false, the fiction should be ex-
tracted from the reasoning eventually.  Vaihinger’s “as if” reasoning
should not depend on the truth or falsity of the foreign element
inserted.
Legal fictions are better understood, then, not as treating falsities
as if they were true, but rather as treating matters as if they were
true, regardless of whether they are true or false, or whether their
truth or falsity is unknown or even unknowable.  A better definition of
legal fiction would be: Legal fictions are a legal rule that, for a specific
purpose, a matter has a set legal effect for which the truth or falsity of
that matter is inconsequential.  The fiction carries that matter outside
of the realm of truth or falsity.
In this way, legal fiction is much like bullshit, as so well explained
by philosopher Harry Frankfurt, in his magisterial treatise, On Bull-
shit.373  Frankfurt wrestles with the relationship between misrepre-
sentation and bullshit, noting that both disrespect the truth, but
misrepresentation is made with a conscious flouting of truth, while for
bullshit, it matters not whether it tells the truth.374  Frankfurt says,
“It is impossible for someone to lie unless he thinks he knows the
truth.  Producing bullshit requires no such conviction.”375  Similarly,
legal fictions require no conviction about the truth, but merely about
the result that the fiction produces.  And yet, legal fictions have an
important distinction from bullshit, fortunately.  Bullshitters do not
necessarily intend to deceive, just as those employing legal fictions do
not necessarily intend to deceive.  However, they have different mo-
tives.  According to Frankfurt, “The fact about himself that the bull-
shitter hides . . . is that the truth-values of his statements are of no
central interest to him; what we are not to understand is that his in-
tention is neither to report the truth nor to conceal it.”376  Both those
employing legal fictions and the bullshitter make statements with dis-
regard for their truth or falsity.  However, those using legal fictions
should not be hiding their intention to disregard the truth, and in-
372. Id. at 117 n.48.
373. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT (2005).
374. Id. at 51–52.
375. Id. at 55.
376. Id.
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stead should be employing legally sanctioned and transparent meth-
ods to do so.
A great benefit of replacing falsity with “as if” for legal fictions is
that it removes any requirement of a specific state of mind of the
maker for a legal fiction.  A litigant should be able to employ a legal
fiction whether the litigant believes the fiction to be true or false, has
no opinion on the subject, or mistakenly believes the fiction is true or
mistakenly believes it is false.  Fuller’s requirement of falsity and his
assertion that safe fictions are those realized and employed as false
would cast legal fictions in doubt when used by those mistaken or ig-
norant of the truth or falsity of the matter.  If this is taken literally, a
court would have to determine whether the user of a legal fiction knew
it was false before permitting that use.
The Chevron fiction, for example, would not function if awareness
of falsity were required for its use.  Whether Congress intended defer-
ence to agency interpretation in any given case may be false, as Con-
gress may not even have considered whether to defer.  It may be true,
as Congress could be legislating with Chevron as a background under-
standing of what deference regime would apply. But, absent some ex-
plicit statement by Congress, demonstrating that truth or falsity could
well be difficult or impossible, as it would require determining what
intent, if any, Congress had—an enterprise fraught with factual and
philosophical obstacles.  Legal fictions may be most useful in instances
like this, where the actual facts are unknowable but yet a determina-
tion still must be made.
C. The Utility and Dangers of Legal Fictions
Just as scholars have argued over the definition of legal fiction, so
too, unsurprisingly, they have long disputed the benefits and hazards
of legal fiction.  The theoretical history of legal fictions and arguments
over their utility and harms could be told as a hypothetical argument
between Jeremy Bentham and Hans Vaihinger, seminal theoreticians
of the proper use of fictions, as continued and expanded upon by their
proxies and acolytes, C.K. Ogden and Lon Fuller, respectively.
Bentham, a political reformer, philosopher, and jurist, active in the
late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, was legendary for his
attacks on legal fiction.  He stated, “In English law, fiction is a
syphilis, which runs in every vein, and carries into every part of the
system the principle of rottenness.”377  And: “[T]he pestilential breath
of Fiction poisons the sense of every instrument it comes near.”378
Bentham was equally remorseless in his attack on the architects of
377. JEREMY BENTHAM, 1 WORKS 92 (Bowring’s ed., 1843), quoted in FULLER, supra
note 273, at 2–3.
378. BENTHAM, supra note 344, at 411.
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legal fictions, the attorneys who asserted them and the judges who
allowed or employed them.  Of the lawyers, he said, “Every criminal
uses the weapons he is most practiced in the use of; the bull uses his
horns, the tiger his claws, the rattle-snake his fangs, the technical
lawyer his lies.  Unlicensed thieves use pick-lock keys; licensed
thieves use fictions.”379
Bentham’s ire at legal fictions was part of his greater antipathy for
the English common law system and his desire to remake it through
the process of codification.380  Bentham condemned the common law
as being locked in secret language and rules, inaccessible to the lay-
man, and considered himself the “Luther of Jurisprudence” for his ef-
forts to free the law from the mediation of lawyers.381  As noted by
Samek, “Bentham’s real complaint surely is that fictions have been
misused by the common law.”382
Bentham’s tool for breaking the shackles of common law was codi-
fication, by which he envisioned the law could be freed from its usur-
pation by judges, fully revealed, and regularized.  Bentham hoped to
replace “the obscurities, inconsistencies, and confusions of the com-
mon law, under which no one could be certain of their rights and du-
ties and hence how to conduct themselves” with “clear, consistent, and
comprehensible” codification.383  His codification project helps explain
his great contempt for legal fictions.  In his efforts to convince others
of the value of codification, he needed a symbol for the unfitness, even
dishonesty of the common law system.  What better symbol could
there be than a legal tool that exhibits its untruthfulness in its very
name?
Later legal scholars acknowledged Bentham’s criticisms but by and
large avoided his venom or his calls for the elimination of legal fic-
tions.  To defend legal fictions and their widespread use in English
common law, scholars developed an ahistorical explanation of their
usefulness in that legal regime.  Maine focused on the usefulness of
legal fiction, at least in more primitive legal systems, to allow judges
to change the law without ostensibly doing so.  Society progresses
more rapidly than law, Maine asserted, and so law requires various
379. OGDEN, supra note 280, at cxvii.
380. For an overview of Bentham’s extensive advocacy for codification, based on his
criticism of the English common law system, see Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchant-
ment of Codification in the Common-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 435, 476–81
(2000).
381. Robert A. Yale, Bentham’s Fictions: Canon and Idolatry in the Genealogy of Law,
17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 151, 158 (2005).
382. Samek, supra note 289, at 298.
383. Philip Schofield, The Legal and Political Legacy of Jeremy Bentham, 9 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 51, 63 (2013).
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tools to catch up with society, namely legal fictions, equity, and
legislation.384
Other scholars also argued that legal fictions were crucial building
blocks of law when in a somewhat primitive state.  Sheldon Amos in
the 1870s considered legal fictions a valid, if sometimes dangerous tool
to be used by judges to change the law while still deferring to the “im-
aginative reverence for old symbols and formalities . . . .”385  Amos
noted that judges often “deceive themselves by tricks practiced upon
their own understandings,” but concluded that because the “value of
the new rule seems so obvious,” but the difficulty of the “bold step of
conscious legislation so insuperable, that the self-deception wins its
way.”386
Amos’s analysis makes clear why Bentham railed against legal fic-
tions, but in the era before codification, such fictions may have been
considered necessary.  Where legislation was ineffective but legal
changes were still needed, legal fictions allowed judges to make those
changes while still paying lip service to the great fiction of the com-
mon law that the judges were not “making law” but instead were
merely announcing what had always been the law, though misunder-
stood or misapplied by earlier courts.387  Gray held that legal fictions
become unnecessary “as a system of Law becomes more perfect, and
its development is carried on by more scientific methods,” as the “bet-
ter definitions and rules” thus produced render legal fictions dispensa-
ble.388  Because the use of legal fictions need only be temporary, to
Gray they “are scaffolding—useful, almost necessary, in construc-
tion—but, after the building is erected, serving only to obscure it.”389
This view that legal fictions were used in primitive legal systems
as building blocks of law, only to drop away once the law had been
developed, does not seem to match the actual history of their use in
the English common law system, as noted by Klerman.  “Maine’s view
that legal fictions belong to the infancy of society, is flatly inconsistent
with the chronology of English legal history.  The most important le-
gal fictions were invented between the fifteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies.  This was several centuries after the establishment of the
English legal system . . . .”390  Rather than being building blocks for
primitive law, many English legal fictions developed when the law
384. MAINE, supra note 280, at 22.
385. SHELDON AMOS, THE SCIENCE OF LAW 55 (2d ed. 1875).
386. Id.
387. Michael Quinn, Fuller on Legal Fictions: A Benthamic Prospective, in LEGAL FIC-
TIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra 283, at 66.
388. GRAY, supra note 280, at 35.
389. Id.
390. Klerman supra note 334, at 8.
2017] DEFERENCE AND FICTION 771
was already developed, employed by courts to increase their jurisdic-
tion and hence fee income.391
Gray asserted that there were two forms of legal fictions, one being
those “historic fictions” that were used in more primitive legal systems
as the scaffolding to create new law while ostensibly preserving the
forms of the old law.392  The great danger of this form to Gray, quoting
Maine, is that they are “the greatest of obstacles to symmetrical clas-
sification” as it is difficult to assess whether to sort the rule according
to its actual or ostensible nature.393  With the development of sophis-
ticated methods of creating law, these historic fictions should fade
away.
The other form of legal fiction, Gray asserts, following Jhering, are
“dogmatic fictions,” ones that do not create new law, but rather sort
and arrange existing law and doctrines into easily understood and
convenient forms by the fiction that disparate legal attributes are the
same so that they can be sorted together.394  Gray’s example of such a
dogmatic fiction is asserting as notice of a mortgage both constructive
notice from the recording of the notice and actual notice.395  While ac-
tual and constructive notice are very different, Gray notes that it is
“convenient to treat the whole subject together,” and so the fiction that
constructive notice is treated as actual notice is a useful one.  Gray
warns, however, that while such dogmatic fictions are compatible even
with advanced legal systems, “one should always be ready to recognize
that the fictions are fictions, and be able to state the real doctrine for
which they stand.”396
Well after Bentham’s passing, the United States went through a
dramatic process of codification, with congressional approval of the
U.S. Code in 1926–1927, extensive state adoptions of similarly ar-
ranged codes, and widespread state adoptions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. 397  Success in the codification movement in the United
States should have solved the problem that legal fictions were de-
signed to circumvent.  American courts no longer faced a hidebound
and theoretically unchangeable common law, filled with ancient and
often unworkable forms of action.
To a significant extent, use of fictions did subside with the increase
of codification as “these New Rules . . . made sad havoc with the pleas-
ing allegories that used to charm us of old.”398  Patterson, in 1953,
391. Id. at 10.
392. GRAY, supra note 280, at 30.
393. Id. at 35.
394. Id. at 36.
395. Id. at 36.
396. Id. at 37.
397. Dru Stevenson, Costs of Codification, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1129, 1140 (2014).
398. MONTHLY L. MAG., supra note 278, at 176.
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stated, “Fortunately these cruder fictions have been largely elimi-
nated from modern law.”399  He also noted, “[S]ome [fictions] have lim-
ited and temporary usefulness for modern law.”400
Still, legal fictions survived, justified in large part by philosophical
explication of their importance to legal and other thought.  If Bentham
was the vitriolic voice against legal fictions, then German philosopher
Vaihinger has been almost inadvertently their greatest theoretical de-
fender.  Vaihinger’s masterpiece was his epic philosophical work The
Philosophy of “As If” and, when it was published in English in 1925, it
had an enormous effect on Western thinking about the use of fictions.
Vaihinger argued that rational thought requires the constant use of
fictional thinking because the human mind cannot apprehend the
world directly and instead does so through fictional thinking, creating
“mental structures” to apprehend and understand the world.  “For
Vaihinger, knowledge of the outside world all the way to the Kantian
notion of the thing in itself was tainted by fictionalilty because our
minds appropriated, assimilated, and constructed reality in a process
of falsification.”401  Using fictions to understand difficult puzzles al-
lows us to pass “through ever finer and subtler developments right up
to the most difficult and complicated methods.”402
To Vaihinger, then, fictions are not mere stratagems to deceive or
to change hidebound rules.  Instead, they are tools to think more
clearly and completely than could be attained using only non-fictive
thinking.  Vaihinger covered legal fictions only briefly in his long vol-
ume, but recognized the danger of legal fictions and cautioned that
they be used with care, stating, “In legal practice the employment of
fiction may lead both to benefits and also the grossest forms of injus-
tice, as when all women were treated as if they were minors.”403  Just
as Bentham railed against legal fictions as part of a greater project,
the codification of law, so too for Vaihinger  legal fictions were only a
small part of his own larger enterprise, which for Vaihinger was the
defense of fictions as necessary, helpful, and unavoidable mechanisms
for human thought generally, to be applied in almost all areas of
human endeavor and thought.
The virtual philosophical duel over the use of fictions between Ben-
tham and Vaihinger was carried on by C.K. Ogden and Fuller in the
1930s.  Ogden had translated Vaihinger’s great work, The Philosophy
of “As If” in 1925, and then, as if in response, published a collection of
399. EDWIN W. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW § 3.26, at 293
(1953).
400. Id. § 4.32, at 416.
401. Gilber Leung, Illegal Fictions, in JEAN-LUC NANCY, JUSTICE, LEGALITY AND
WORLD 84 (Benjamin Hutchens ed., 2012).
402. Vaihinger, supra note 355, at 12–13.
403. Id. at 148.
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Bentham’s writings on fictions in 1932.404  Ogden “snatched Ben-
tham’s theory of fictions from the dustbin of history”405 to claim for
Bentham the primacy of his work on fictions, and even argued that the
greatest defect in Vaihinger’s work, its “failure to lay stress on the
linguistic factor in the creation of fictions,” had “already been taken by
Bentham a century ago.”406
Fuller, enamored of Vaihinger’s philosophy, rejected Bentham’s
work on fictions in general and legal fictions in particular, as well as
Ogden’s work bringing forth both Bentham and Vaihinger.  Fuller
seemed determined to vanquish Bentham and leave the field clear for
Vaihinger.  Of Bentham’s work in fictions, Fuller said, “[T]he neglect
which posterity has bestowed on this part of Bentham’s writings has
been pretty thoroughly deserved.  Bentham’s turn of mind was inimi-
cal to the painstaking reflection demanded by these subjects.”407  Of
Bentham on legal fictions, Fuller said, “Bentham nowhere shows more
clearly his lack of fundamental insight than in his treatment of legal
fictions.”  Fuller went so far as to criticize even Ogden’s translation of
Vaihinger, calling it “quite unsatisfactory” and, in his own book on
legal fictions, supplying his own.408  Fuller’s esteem for Vaihinger can
be seen by the fact that the last third of his great book on legal fictions
is essentially an extended book review of Vaihinger’s “As If.”409
Vaihinger’s theories of fiction clearly cast an immense philosophi-
cal shadow, especially on Fuller, in the 1920s and ’30s, which, until
recently, was the last time that legal scholars seriously and at length
considered the topic of legal fiction.410  To Fuller, the question was not
whether legal fictions were beneficial or harmful, but whether they
are unavoidable building blocks of legal reasoning, as useful to ra-
tional thought as analogies.  Fuller stated, “The age of legal fiction is
not over.  We are not dealing with a topic of antiquarian interest
404. OGDEN, supra note 280.
405. Robert A. Yelle, Bentham’s Fictions: Canon and Idolatry in the Genealogy of Law,
17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 151, 161 (2005).
406. OGDEN, supra note 280, at xxxii.  Stolzenberg notes, “At one extreme, Ogden
holds that it anticipates, and indeed surpasses, the linguistic theories of such
celebrated twentieth-century philosophers as the German pragmatist, Vaihinger,
whose turn-of-the-century Philosophy of “As If” (“Die Philosophie des Als Ob”)
briefly took the academy by storm . . . .”  Stolzenberg, supra note 276, at 229.
407. L. L. Fuller, Book Reviews, 47 HARV. L. REV. 367, 367 (1933) (reviewing OGDEN,
supra note 280).
408. FULLER, supra note 273, at 94 & n.3.  Fuller used his own translations from the
German, even though he admitted that they are “in some cases rather free.” Id.
at 2, 94 n.3.
409. Lon Fuller, Is Fiction an Indispensable Instrument of Human Thinking?, in
FULLER, supra note 273, at 93.
410. Stolzenberg, supra note 276, at 231–32 (“Fuller associated this view with the
Vaihinger As-If philosophy then in vogue—conveniently neglecting to mention
both Bentham’s adumbration of similar views, and Ogden’s claim that Bentham
deserves credit for articulating Vaihinger’s theory of fictions better and first.”).
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merely.  We are in contact with a fundamental trait of human
reasoning.”411
To Fuller, legal fictions often work by grouping disparate elements
together, such as a corporation and a person, and working with them
as though they were somehow one and the same and thus, “We call a
corporation a person.”412  This operation, which Fuller borrows from
Vaihinger, leads Fuller to an important conclusion that he, unlike
Vaihinger,413 applies to legal fictions.  “The fiction must drop out of
the final reckoning.”414  This, for Fuller, is the crucial step in employ-
ing legal fictions, so significant that he calls the failure to do so “the
original sin of human reasoning”415 namely hypostatization, or the
treating of a concept as a distinct reality.416  A legal fiction is there-
fore the introduction of an intentional error into a system of legal
thinking for a specific, useful purpose, with the intention of dropping
it out from the final reckoning, and Fuller asserts that the legal fiction
is “harmless” in its intended use within its specific system “because
there it is subjected to the corrective effect of other elements in the
same process.”417  However, if the legal fiction is wrenched from “its
corrective background and given a value on its own account, the inevi-
table result is intellectual disaster.”418
Fuller’s work on legal fictions is notable not just because it is
widely considered the most complete and significant ever completed
about legal fictions but also because it provided a permanent justifica-
tion for the existence and continued use of legal fictions even in the
most sophisticated legal systems.  For Maine and those who followed
him, legal fictions were useful at the primitive states of legal systems,
when legislatures were ill-equipped to create new law to address new
situations and common law judges felt unfree to “make law.”  How-
ever, with the success of the codification movement, that great dream
of Bentham, the need and hence use of legal fictions should have faded
away.  However, to Fuller, legal fictions were permanently necessary
building blocks of legal thought as “a fundamental trait of human
reason.”419
411. FULLER, supra note 273, at 94.
412. Id.
413. In one of his few criticisms of Vaihinger, Fuller states, “Vaihinger’s own state-
ment that such a correction is not necessary in the case of legal fictions can only
be attributed to his lack of an intimate acquaintance with the legal fiction.” Id. at
117, n.48 (citations omitted).
414. Id. at 117.
415. Id. at 118.
416. WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1996) (defining “hyposta-
tize” as “to treat or regard (a concept, idea, etc.) as a distinct substance or
reality”).
417. FULLER, supra note 273, at 119.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 94.
2017] DEFERENCE AND FICTION 775
By lodging the justification of legal fiction in Vaihinger’s pragmatic
philosophy, rather than in Maine’s historical explanation, Fuller pro-
vided a rationale for the enduring existence of legal fictions and their
continued creation.  As scholarly interest in this subject died, Fuller’s
explanation for legal fictions faded to some extent from view, but still
there remained the view that legal fictions had been explained and
justified, though just how was no longer quite or widely understood.
VIII. REFORMING CHEVRON’S FICTIONS
A. Lessons About Legal Fictions and Their Application to
the Chevron Fiction
After Fuller’s great exegesis of legal fiction in the 1930s, scholarly
work on this topic largely disappeared.  As time passed, the under-
standing of the function of legal fictions faded, and they seemed as
something that was understood once, were not as important as they
once were, but still had been justified, though for reasons now not well
understood.  The lessons learned from studying legal fictions largely
faded from view as well.  And so when scholars and judges refer to the
Chevron doctrine as “a legal fiction,” it is not clear that they under-
stand the import of that statement or what it tells us about how the
Chevron doctrine should be constructed, applied, or changed.  What
follows then, is a set of the lessons that scholars of legal fictions have
deduced from their study, and an effort to apply those lessons to the
Chevron fiction.
Perhaps the most important lesson emphasized time and time
again is that legal fictions must be transparent and judges who use
them should do so always cognizant that they are employing a fic-
tion.420  Bentham powerfully criticized the English legal fictions of his
day as tricks employed by judges and litigants to circumvent the law,
as the fictions of his day were not used in a transparent manner.  Be-
cause the legal fictions employed by English trial courts were not ap-
parent in the record, appellate courts had difficulty regulating and
limiting the use of legal fictions, and so trial judges gained un-
supervised power.  By comparison, Roman legal fictions were gram-
matically obvious, taking an “as if” form so the fiction was apparent in
the direction from the praetor.421  De Tourtoulon noted that legal fic-
tions “cannot falsify a process of reasoning . . . so long as one can calcu-
late to what extent they represent real, and what extent imaginary,
disposition.”422
420. GRAY, supra note 280, at 37 (“[O]ne should always be ready to recognize that the
fictions are fictions . . . .”).
421. FULLER, supra note 273, at 36.
422. DE TOURTOULON, supra note 2, at 390.
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The use of the Chevron fiction clearly violates this fundamental
precept.  As of the time of this writing, no federal or state case in
America has used the term “Chevron fiction.”423  Discussions of Chev-
ron and fiction in state and federal cases are few and sparse. 424  Two
cases do have at least cursory mention that Chevron includes a fiction,
though do little with that conclusion.425  Scalia’s dissent to Mead dis-
cusses a Chevron-related fiction, but Scalia is referring to the fiction
embedded in Mead itself, the fiction that it is not changing the ex-
isting Chevron doctrine.426  Fuller asserted that “fiction becomes
wholly safe only when it is used with a complete consciousness of its
falsity.”427  However, courts applying the Chevron fiction, even the
Supreme Court, rarely display much evidence of consciousness of its
fictional basis.
King v. Burwell constitutes an especially egregious example of a
court employing numerous Chevron-related fictions without address-
ing how the fictional nature of the doctrine it employs may affect that
application.  First, the Court states, “This approach ‘is premised on
the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delega-
tion from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.’”428
While the word “implicit” signals that a fiction is being employed, it
hardly does so directly.  The Court quotes FDA v. Brown and William-
son for a fictional exception to the fiction of implicit congressional del-
egation: “In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to
hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an im-
423. A Westlaw search performed on November 3, 2016, revealed no federal or state
court case using the term “Chevron fiction.”
424. Ironically, one of the Obamacare cases discussed “legal fiction” in the context of
Chevron, but it was not the Chevron fiction the court discussed, but rather that it
considered the claim that federal exchanges constituted state exchanges for the
purposes of the ACA a “legal fiction.”  Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Burwell, 51 F.
Supp. 3d 1080, 1089 (E.D. Okla. 2014).
425. Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 2002) (“But realists,
while acknowledging . . . that it is a fiction to suppose Chevron itself an interpre-
tation of the statutes to which it applies or that the exercise of power by ap-
pointed officials is democratic merely because it is authorized by elected officials,
will applaud the Supreme Court’s recognition that the interpretation of an am-
biguous statute is an exercise in policy formulation rather than in reading.”);
Coal. for Responsible Regulation., Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322, 2012 WL 6621785, at
*10 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (“Chevron deference operates on the assumption
‘that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation,’ but this tenuous
fiction need not hold true in every situation.”).
426. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[I]n order to maintain the fiction that the new test is really just the old one,
applied consistently throughout our case law, the Court must make a virtually
open-ended exception to its already imprecise guidance . . . .”).
427. FULLER, supra note 273, at 10.
428. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
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plicit delegation.”429  The Court concludes its analysis by stating an-
other fiction, “It is especially unlikely that Congress would have
delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting
health insurance policy of this sort.”430  Note that the Court uses the
conditional “would have,” along with the word “unlikely,” showing
that the Court is dealing with speculative possibilities, not actual del-
egation or lack thereof.  Worse yet, the Court’s speculative possibility
flies directly in the face of Congress’s explicit delegation of decisions
about tax subsidies to the IRS in the ACA itself.431  Nowhere in King
v. Burwell does the Court directly acknowledge the layers of fictions it
is employing.  Nor is the Court transparent in how it uses them and
why.
Secondly, legal fictions should always be used with an awareness
of their purposes and the reasons for their creation.432  Where those
purposes or reasons do not apply, the legal fictions should not be al-
lowed.  And so, judges must always be cognizant of the fictions they
are employing, the purpose of those fictions, and their shortfalls.
Mansfield noted that when legal fictions “are urged to an intent and
purpose not within the reason and policy of the fiction, the other party
may show the truth.”433  Lord MacMillan urged against legal fictions
“extended by a process of logical development which loses sight of
their origin and carries them far beyond the reach of any such justifi-
cation as they may have originally possessed.” 434  Judges who know
of a legal fiction, but not its original justification, may reason based on
the fiction to arrive at holdings that the fiction does not justify and
was never intended to reach.  Pound noted that fictions are “deliber-
ately made by known men to meet definite demands in concrete
cases.”435  And so legal fictions should be limited to only the specific
definite demands for which they were intended.
Chevron’s use seems to violate this edict.  The original Chevron de-
cision carried with it the pragmatic justifications for the delegation
fiction, such as Congress’s intent to delegate authority to agencies to
make “second-level policy decisions, the greater experience and exper-
tise agencies should have to interpret statutes that they administer,
and their greater political accountability through the President, espe-
cially compared to Article III judges, with their lifetime tenure.”436
429. Id. at 2488–89 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159).
430. Id. at 2489.
431. See discussion of this point supra Part III.
432. GRAY, supra note 280, at 37 (“[O]ne should always . . . be able to state the real
doctrine for which they stand.”); see also FULLER, supra note 273, at 50–51.
(“[F]ictions are to be applied in the light of the reasons back of them.”).
433. Morris v. Pugh (1761) 97 Eng. Rep. (H.L.) 1242, 1243.
434. Radcliffe v. Ribble Motor Servs. Ltd. (1939) AC (H.L.) 215, 235.
435. ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 131 (1923).
436. Angstreich, supra note 87, at 90–91.
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However, as the Court in Mead emphasized the delegation doctrine
almost to the exclusion of its original underlying rational, that fic-
tional delegation “loses sight of its origin” and so can justify decisions
unrelated to those policy bases.  As Criddle notes, “[A]s a legal fiction
of indeterminate content, Mead liberates the Court from having to
ground its application of Chevron deference in any objectively verifia-
ble criteria. . . . Far from enhancing judicial restraint and accountabil-
ity, Mead’s flexible delegation inquiry enhances judicial discretion and
conceals judicial policymaking.”437
Arguably, Step Zero is the Court’s method of piercing the Chevron
fiction when its application would lead to injustice, a result scholars of
legal fictions would likely applaud.  However, rather than formulating
Step Zero in a straightforward fashion as a way to disregard the Chev-
ron fiction when its use conflicts with the policies that justify it, as
noted above, most Step Zero applications are formulated as an addi-
tional set of fictions regarding when Congress would not want the
Chevron fiction to be applied.
King v. Burwell shows how Chevron’s fiction and fictional excep-
tions can lead courts away from the original policies that could justify
that fiction.  Criddle argues that the core values justifying the Chev-
ron fiction are: “(1) congressionally delegated authority, (2) agency ex-
pertise, (3) political responsiveness and accountability, (4) deliberative
rationality, and (5) national uniformity.”438  Here, the Court ignores
the express delegation to Treasury and IRS of matters covered in the
section at issue, as well as the greater political responsiveness and
accountability agencies in the Executive Branch have than Supreme
Court Justices with a life appointment.  The Court makes much of the
IRS’s lack of agency expertise, but it ignores the mandate that the IRS
and Treasury work with HHS, which presumably has such expertise.
While the Court might well argue it can engage in greater deliberative
rationality than Treasury and the IRS, it ignores one of the strongest
arguments for it deciding this matter rather than Treasury and the
IRS, uniformity.  Here, temporal uniformity, the uniformity of inter-
pretation across a multitude of presidential administrations, could be
crucial and is a reason for a binding Supreme Court, rather than a
changeable Executive Branch, decision.439  However, because the
Court is dealing with the Chevron fiction rather than the underlying
437. Criddle, supra note 86, at 1314.
438. Id. at 1275.
439. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1310
(2016) (“[I]t would make no sense to create a legal environment that would vary
over time depending on whether Democrats—who strongly support the ACA—or
Republicans—who strongly oppose the ACA—control the executive branch.  The
resulting vacillation in statutory interpretations would create uncertainty and
chaos for citizens, insurance companies, and the agencies charged with responsi-
bility to implement the statute.”).
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policies, that strong basis goes unremarked.  The Chevron doctrine
has been justifiably criticized for increasing “temporal inconsistency
in interpretation of national statutes . . . .”440  However, deference to
the Chevron fiction seems to preclude the Court from addressing this
major issue in its decision.
Losing sight of the fictional nature of the Chevron delegation doc-
trine has clouded courts’ development of rules affected by Chevron,
such as the stare decisis effect of court decisions based on deference.
Without policy justification, stare decisis effect is tied to the level of
deference, if any, granted to the agency’s interpretation rather than to
independent reasons for a binding court decision.  Courts that discern
a need for a strong stare decisis effect may feel compelled to find a
Step Zero exit from Chevron, even if none seems appropriate.  The
courts may be refusing to defer to agency interpretation not because of
any policy reason for non-deference but rather to avoid the weakening
of stare decisis that such deferral could cause.  In King, the Court ap-
pears to have misread the cases it relied on to reach a decision at Step
Zero and then ostensibly ignored the work of Treasury and the IRS,
perhaps in large part to settle the matter permanently.  A greater un-
derstanding of the fiction of Chevron might allow the Court to disen-
tangle the deference issue from the stare decisis issue and develop
more rational policies for each.
Another lesson from Fuller on legal fictions was that they should
be understood and recognized so that, at the end of the analysis the
legal fiction could, Fuller insisted, be dropped from the final reckon-
ing.441  Far from being dropped from the final reckoning, the Chevron
fiction has been expanding, with the Court adding layers of fictional
exceptions to its central fiction.  Courts should be making Chevron de-
cisions with greater attention to the underlying values Chevron sup-
ports.  Instead, the Court is strengthening and doubling down on the
fictions.  The Court’s Chevron discussion in King v. Burwell is merely
a string of fictions leading to a conclusion, with little discussion of the
purposes or policies purportedly served by the Chevron fiction.  The
fiction is overwhelming the policy of the Chevron doctrine.
Courts should sparingly and cautiously use what Maine called the
“historical fictions” and Fuller deemed “creative fictions” that create
substantive law, always cognizant of the dangers of such judge-cre-
ated law.442  Even dogmatic fictions, useful to understand, categorize,
and manipulate law, are “dangerous tools” if misused and “should
never be used, as the historic fictions were used, to change the Law,
but only for the purpose of classifying established rules, and one
440. Id. at 1297.
441. FULLER, supra note 273, at 117.
442. Id.
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should always be ready to recognize that the fictions are fictions, and
be able to state the real doctrine for which they stand.”443
Applying Gray’s analysis, we see that Chevron fiction served an
initial useful function as a creative legal fiction.  With the rise of the
administrative state, the law needed to adapt to the complex regula-
tory statutes administered by federal agencies with their interpretive
ability and expertise.  However, the scaffolding of Chevron obscures
the policy rationales that made its delegation of interpretation useful.
At this stage in the development of Chevron jurisprudence, its fiction
should be no longer used as a creative fiction, but rather as a dogmatic
fiction, allowing courts to understand the various factors that would
lead to delegation by grouping them under the fiction of congressional
intent, while recognizing that Chevron delegation is a fiction and
courts should always be “able to state the real doctrine” for which it
stands.444
Unfortunately, the Court has not recognized the need to change
Chevron fiction from a creative fiction to a dogmatic fiction, and con-
tinues to use it willy-nilly to create law.  In Mead, the Court created a
fictional exception to Chevron, which, as noted above, has led to great
confusion.  In King v. Burwell, the Court continues this creationist use
of the Chevron fiction, announcing with terse and unconvincing rea-
soning, “This is not a case for the IRS.”445
A final lesson to be drawn from previous analyses of legal fiction is
that fiction should not be used where the result is confusion and
where the fictions prevent courts from understanding or wisely using
the law at issue.  Maine stated, in discussing legal fictions, “I cannot
admit any anomaly to be innocent, which makes the law either more
difficult to understand or harder to arrange in harmonious order.” 446
It is clear that the Chevron doctrine and its multiple, at times conflict-
ing fictions, is a mess, and courts find it challenging, and so the entire
doctrine calls out for reform.
B. How Reforming Chevron’s Legal Fiction Fixes the Mess
of Chevron
While bitter battles continue over the worth of Chevron as a doc-
trine,447 whether Chevron is even constitutionally permissible,448 and
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
446. MAINE, supra note 280, at 32.
447. Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Prece-
dent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1797 (2010).
448. See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1206
(2016) (arguing that the Chevron doctrine violates the duty of judges to exercise
2017] DEFERENCE AND FICTION 781
whether it has led to real change in the amount of deference actually
engaged in by courts,449 most scholars seem to believe that Chevron,
whatever its pros and cons, is a mess.450  The mess began at the start,
as Justice Stevens apparently thought he was merely restating a
traditional analysis while at the same time caused one of the greatest
changes in administrative law.451  It is difficult to imagine that the
result of such an inadvertent change would be tidy.
Even defenders of Mead as explicator of Chevron acknowledge the
challenge Chevron’s application throws at judges.452  Merrill identifies
two sources for the confusion that Mead has caused.  One source he
identifies is how Mead combines the implicit delegation doctrine,
which seems a hard-and-fast rule generally requiring deference in the
face of statutory ambiguity, with what Merrill called a “Skidmore-
ized” version of Chevron, which could satisfy Breyer’s “need to con-
sider multiple contextual factors in deciding how much deference to
give to agency interpretations in any particular case.”453  The second
source of confusion Merrill identifies is that Souter, who drafted the
Mead opinion, seemed determined to demonstrate that the Court’s
earlier Chevron decisions somehow conformed to the Mead’s new
“threshold condition” for the application of Chevron, and in trying to
leave that threshold condition flexible enough to explain all previous
precedents, “left the threshold inquiry so flabby that even opinion let-
ters might qualify in certain circumstances . . . .”454
To clean up the Chevron mess, it would be useful clean up the mess
of the fictions by reforming them.  This article is by no means the first
to argue for such an effort.  Anderson noted,
independent judgment, the “most fundamental element of the office of a judge as
established by Article III.  Thus, when judges acquiesce in Chevron deference,
they unconstitutionally abandon their very office as judges.”).
449. Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 829
(2010) (“The most striking objective measure of the failure of Chevron is that it
does not appear to have succeeded in substantially increasing the level of defer-
ence to agency statutory interpretation.”).
450. See, e.g., The U.S. Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV.
335, 395 (2007) (discussing how the Court “turned a routine statutory interpreta-
tion case into a Chevron mess by inverting the traditional Chevron analysis. . . .”).
451. Thomas W. Merrill, Justice Stevens and the Chevron Puzzle, 106 Nw. U. L. REV.
551, 557-58 (2012) (“Nor is there evidence that Justice Stevens himself regarded
Chevron as having inaugurated any change in the way courts approach agency
interpretations.”).
452. Kristin E. Hickman, supra note 108, at 553 (“The justices’ shifting rhetoric makes
its adherence to and application of Mead seem much more fickle than it is and,
further, is highly frustrating to lower court judges, litigants, and commentators
who seek consistency in the Court’s guidance.”).
453. Merrill, supra note 106, at 767.
454. Id. at 767.
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There is nothing per se wrong with legal fictions; they have played a long and
mostly honorable role in common law development. . . .  [H]owever, the bewil-
dering confusion in the decisions and the commentary suggests that the dele-
gation fiction is not a useful tool—neither the occasions for invoking it nor its
content when invoked are capable of clear statement.455
One method to clean up the mess of Chevron’s fictions is to elimi-
nate them.  One possibility for doing this is to merely overrule Chev-
ron and take us back to the pre-Chevron case-by-case
determinations.456  However, such a “solution” would force courts to
take a much more active role in patching holes in legislation involving
an administrative agency, a role courts may be ill-equipped and loath
to perform at this late date.
Alternatively, Congress could codify Chevron in some form, to have
Congress explicitly state what level of deference courts should afford
agencies and when.  There are several possible ways to codify Chev-
ron.  The simplest, across-the-board method would be to merely
amend the APA, probably at section 706, and instead to state explic-
itly the terms of courts deference to agencies.  William Anderson has
proposed such an amendment, and while it is fairly short and sweet,
its brevity may cause as much confusion and turmoil as the confusing
complexity of Chevron and its progeny.457
Another method would be for Congress, when it constructs stat-
utes, to indicate in each statute when and how it would want courts to
defer to agency decision.  A model of such a proposal is the explicit
limitation of deference to the OCC in Dodd–Frank, mandating that
Chevron deference would not be applied and that instead the OCC
would receive only Skidmore deference.458  However, Dodd–Frank and
Congress’s explicit statutory determination of the deference to be
given the OCC was a special case.  As previously discussed, Congress
had before it a history of preemption abuse by the OCC, which the
OCC had protected from court review by demanding deference by
courts.  When Congress is enacting new statutes, it normally does not
have such a history of deference abuse, and so would have less reason
to determine explicitly the level of deference to be given and less infor-
mation about what effects different levels of deference might have.
455. Andersen, supra note 213, at 963–64.
456. Beermann, supra note 449, at 810–11 (proposing that Chevron merely be
overruled).
457. Under Andersen’s proposal, a court “may defer” where the agency’s interpreta-
tion “(a) is authoritative, (b) significantly reflects relevant agency technical, polit-
ical or other resources, (c) was formulated through a careful process, including
providing those specially affected with an appropriate opportunity to participate
in its formulation and (d) does not require the special weight of a judicial pro-
nouncement and determine the meaning and applicability of the terms of an
agency action.”  Andersen, supra note 213, at 964.
458. Barnett, supra note 82.
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A third method of legislating deference through direct congres-
sional action would be to have Congress, when it reauthorizes agen-
cies, to conduct a review of all delegation to each agency and
determine whether and to what extent such delegation makes sense,
given the performance of the agency.  Elizabeth Garrett, who proposed
this option, noted, “In particular, Congress could assess the perform-
ance of each agency and judge whether it is the best entity to make the
policy decisions inherent in interpreting vague or ambiguous statu-
tory language.”459
Of course, given the current gridlock in Congress, with congres-
sional hearings often being more sound and fury than function, it is
almost impossible to imagine Congress engaging in a thoughtful re-
view process that results in a coherent allocation of decision-making
power between courts and agencies.  More likely, Congress would tend
to have courts defer to agencies when the majority in Congress is of
the same party as the president, but not defer when Congress would
wish to block the power of a president of a different party.
Another, nonlegislative option would be for the Court to replace
the legal fiction of congressional delegation with a set of core concerns,
all of which must be satisfied for the agency to receive more than
Skidmore deference.  Criddle has proposed such a change, arguing
that there are five core concerns implicated in court deference to
agency interpretation of statutes: “(1) congressionally delegated au-
thority, (2) agency expertise, (3) political responsiveness and account-
ability, (4) deliberative rationality, and (5) national uniformity.”460
While these criteria are parts of the legal fictions by which Chevron
and its Step Zero exceptions are constructed, Criddle would eliminate
the fictions and apply the concerns directly.  “Where all of Chevron’s
five core rationales are satisfied, federal courts should defer to agen-
cies’ flexible interpretations of ambiguous statutes.”461  If not all of
the core rationales are satisfied, “courts should determine instead
whether the agency’s preferred interpretation is otherwise persuasive
under Skidmore’s residual balancing test.”462
The hazard of Criddle’s proposal is how easy it would be for a court
to find that at least one of these core concerns would be compromised
by deference to an agency, and so the proposal could easily lead to the
excessive limitation of deference, especially by self-interested courts.
Further, the proposal does not seem to be presented as a balancing
test, so that a very strong level of deliberative rationality by an agency
may not compensate for a lack of national uniformity.  Also, the Crid-
dle test seems to be a conglomeration of disparate interests, and
459. Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2641 (2003).
460. Criddle, supra note 86, at 1275.
461. Id. at 1320.
462. Id.
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courts may have trouble conceptualizing it without an underlying
theme.  A five-part test of wildly disparate elements may lead to court
confusion and hence unpredictable results.  Also, by explicitly naming
five and only five recognized core concerns, Criddle’s proposal could
limit the development of law in response to new concerns or a court’s
flexibility in dealing with unusual facts or issues.
For all these reasons, replacing the delegation fiction with a fixed
grid of five core rationales may prove problematic, and reviewing
these problems shows the advantage of the Chevron delegation fiction,
so long as the courts always understand that it is a fiction.  One ad-
vantage of the delegation fiction, if used as a dogmatic rather than
creative fiction, is that it provides a unifying theme to courts’ defer-
ence inquiry, allowing courts to balance a multiplicity of factors that
might affect the need for deference through the lens of the delegation
fiction.
A better way to reform the Chevron fictions then, and what this
article proposes, would be to treat the delegation fictions as dogmatic
rather than creative fictions, to use them as a way of categorizing,
understanding, and reasoning from the underlying policy arguments,
rather than treating the legal fictions as justifications in and of them-
selves.  In other words, the question, “Would Congress intend courts to
defer?” should not be treated as a quest to determine Congress’s intent
where Congress has not provided evidence of that intent, because as
Scalia noted, that would be a pointless, wild-goose chase.  Instead, ab-
sent real evidence of congressional intent, the courts should ask
whether and to what extent a rational Congress would intend courts
to defer in the circumstance in question.
By acknowledging the delegation fiction and using it as a tool to be
employed rather than a pointless quest for hypothetical congressional
intent, courts would be using the delegation fictions the way that
scholars of legal fiction such as Fuller and Gray understood as the
proper method to employ fictions.  Instead of pretending to divine, ab-
sent any evidence, whether Congress might or might not have in-
tended courts to defer to federal agencies, courts should be using the
legal fictions they have created to sort through and understand the
policy implications of the possible deference decisions.  They should
treat the fictions as dogmatic fictions, with a clear understanding of
their fictional nature, to understand and sort court-created rules and
policies of deference.
In this way, the Court could separate stare decisis free from agency
reinterpretation from a finding of unambiguousness.  Using the tool of
legal fictions in the method earlier scholars envisioned would enable
the Court to reform its problematic deference regime.  When courts
discover ambiguity in a statute administered by an agency, under this
proposal, they would no longer be required to engage in knee-jerk def-
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erence to the agency unless they discover some perhaps fictional Step
Zero rationale for not engaging in the Chevron Two-Step.  Instead,
they would acknowledge the fiction of the delegation doctrine directly,
and use it to ask the underlying policy questions.
Instead of blindly following little understood fictions, courts would
be seeking the answers to the pertinent policy questions.  Has Con-
gress given the agency the authority to engage in the kind of formal-
ized rulemaking procedures that would lead the agency to make a
thoughtful, informed determination?  Has the agency appropriately
used those procedures and explained its rationale?  Is the agency
likely to have particular expertise and/or institutional memory such
that it is better able than a court to reach an appropriate interpreta-
tion?  Is this a subject for which the greater political accountability of
agencies makes them the better interpreters?  Is there a need for
stronger stare decisis such that the agency gets at most one free shot
at a determination?  Or, alternatively, is this the type of interpreta-
tion that agencies should be free to remake and revamp as adminis-
trations or the situation changes?  Is there a need for national
uniformity that a federal agency can provide?  Is there an extreme
need for temporal unity, so that a quick decision now is better than a
more thoughtful decision later?
There is a plethora of factors that a court should consider and new
factors may emerge, and the delegation fiction can help courts sort
through all of these factors to decide whether to defer, and how
“sticky” their deference decision should be.  Using the delegation fic-
tion as dogmatic fiction, a sorting mechanism that provides clarity,
would give courts a more powerful tool to analyze deference than the
difficult-to-understand-and-blindly-applied creative fiction Chevron
now constitutes.  And it would give the courts more leeway to weigh
the different concerns against each other and to analyze new concerns
and situations than would Criddle’s core concerns method.  In short,
using legal fictions as they were intended would resolve much of the
current mess that is Chevron.
IX. CONCLUSION
Legal fictions have been at the heart of law since Roman times,
and it is clear that they are unlikely to go away any time soon.  How-
ever, the damage that legal fictions do can be prevented, to a great
extent, by understanding their function and dangers.  In the modern
era, too many who employ legal fictions have forgotten their intended
use and purposes, and so suffer from the damages wrought by legal
fictions created and employed without such knowledge and under-
standing.  In the Chevron doctrine, the Supreme Court has dug itself
into a nasty pit by first creating the fiction of the congressional delega-
tion implicit in ambiguity in statutes administered by federal agen-
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cies, then devising fictional exceptions to that central fiction.  So long
as the Court treats it not as a fiction but as an actual assumption
about how Congress intends courts to defer, were Congress only to
have an intent and to express it, the Court will have great difficulty in
working itself out of the Chevron mess that it has created.  As it cre-
ates more and more fictions to solve the problems that its initial fic-
tions have caused, the Court loses further track of the underlying
policy rationales that underpin its delegation doctrine.
Instead, the Court should boldly confront the fictions of Chevron
and, by doing so, render them transparent and workable.  The Court
should treat them as dogmatic fictions, useful for categorizing the is-
sues that make up Chevron and its Step Zero, not shackles to prevent
reasoned decision-making.  By understanding the Chevron fictions as
fictions, the Court can remove the scaffolding with which it has ob-
scured the structure of the law regulating judicial deference to agency
interpretation.
